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**THE BASES OF A  
WORLD COMMONWEALTH**



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FRONTIERS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

PROVINCES OF ENGLAND

A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

# THE BASES OF A WORLD COMMONWEALTH

*By*

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## PREFACE

THIS work attempts to discuss the bases for a World Commonwealth. It is a statement of what I believe to be essential facts regarding these bases; but it is not a constitution for a world state, or even a plan for the establishment of world unity. It is concerned with the "what" and the "who" of the foundations of world unity and not directly with the "how." It does not include any list of foundation members for a world federation.

The bases are necessarily twofold—material and moral. They rest on the will of man and on the facts of geography, which need to be linked by adequate knowledge.

Western civilization has by now attained to a considerable degree of control over the natural resources of the earth and the means of communication and transport over its surface. This made much of the world an economic whole in the generation before 1914; and it can now be used to organize the whole world as one unit for human purposes. Hence the discussion of the material bases is that of the distribution of the chief natural resources and of the routes by which they may be brought together. This geo-

graphical section, mainly in Chapter II, is vital to the argument as the material foundation is vital to any building, and as the facts of geography are to the life of man. It makes clear that there are on the earth only a very few limited and definable areas which can be the bases of world power. Of these the European and American major human regions are the chief; together these two can determine the form and the establishment of world unity. Important conditions for the co-operation of their peoples are discussed in the following chapters, on Europe, Language, and the Englishry, and something of their relation to other parts of the world in that on Dependencies. The methods of such co-operation, and their effects on political organization, are outside the plan of this work. That is part of the building; here we discuss foundations.

The equally vital non-material bases are referred to in the remaining chapters. I believe that the essential dispute is between those who hold to the ideal of human brotherhood and those who claim to be a master race, or merely "superior" people, with a right to rule and to a privileged position independent of any services they render. Few people are consistently and wholeheartedly in only one of these camps. Nevertheless the distinction is vital; and the world is now so small, in terms of human intercommunications, that it can admit only one of these incompatibles as a guiding rule.

Democracy can no longer either maintain its *liberté* or make any further progress towards *égalité* unless it accepts *fraternité* as its guiding principle. All political, social, and economic facts and adjustments should be judged by the degree to which they favour or hinder the realization of the brotherhood of man. In particular all education should be directed towards this end.

There are but two unchangeable natural units of human organization—the individual and the whole of mankind. All intermediate units, such as the family, clan, tribe or nation, church or state, or other association, are changeable and changing. Man is a social being and can be happy only as a member of a human group. So groups are necessary and inevitable. Yet any sound plan for world organization should be based on the permanent units, not on any of the changing groups. It should aim to include all mankind and be based on the individual human being.

In conclusion I hold that in the present state of the world the power to initiate a new world in which these democratic ideals can be realized lies with the American and British Commonwealths in co-operation. Together they can save themselves and their ideals; but only by saving the world. They will, if they give a strong lead, have the support of all the freedom-loving peoples of both the old and new worlds. No one else is in a position to strike effectively for freedom. Therefore

the call is to the Englishry. Theirs is the opportunity to make a new world. Can they rise to the greatness of the task? Now, in the midst of war, when the political and economic systems of Europe and its empires are in violent flux, the world of man is plastic and may be re-shaped, the mind of man is open and willing to accept great changes. Now is the time to act; and the Englishry can now decide whether their ideals and their way of life shall prevail or shall perish, remembering that these things cannot survive as the perquisite of only a few people.

. . . . .

In previous articles I have set out some of the ideas here collected into a book; and I owe thanks to the Councils and Editors of the Royal Geographical Society, the Royal Scottish Geographical Society, and the New Commonwealth Institute,\* for permission to use parts of such articles, including figures 3, 4, 6, and 8.

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\* This institute changed its name in 1943. It is now The London Institute of World Affairs.

## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE final proofs of the first edition of this book were posted on June 21, 1941. At dawn on June 22 the German armies attacked Russia, and opened the fifth major phase of the war.

It is now possible to note briefly some of the changes since then which are related to the topic of this work. None of them has led me to make any substantial change in the body of the book, though it has been revised carefully. There is no change in the natural geographical facts or in the human aspirations. But the events of the last two years have thrown fresh light on some of these facts and their use by man, and on the possibilities of realizing some of the aspirations, which may be noted here.

After the fall of France it was obvious that the next assault would be on the British. That failed when the *Luftwaffe* was defeated in the Battle of Britain, and the U-boats failed to blockade our islands. From June 1940 to the late spring of 1941 the Axis powers gave their full attentions to Britain and failed to destroy us; while their efforts strengthened the unity of the British peoples.

The situation inside Europe must have seemed to the Germans almost desperate before they decided to attack Russia while Britain was still undefeated. We know their dread of the "war on two fronts," a dread fully



shared by Hitler. The pressure on the Germans, between the British blockade and the Russian refusal of supplies, must have been much more severe than we realized.

It is certain that, like the rest of the world, the Germans very much under-estimated the power of the Soviet Union. They had made fairly correct estimates of the strength of several European states; and, though by mid-1941 there was abundant evidence that their estimates of Britain had been wrong, they were still confident in their estimates of Russia. So on June 22, 1941, they attacked the Russian wall.

If their estimates had been even approximately correct the attack would have been a good gamble. Britain was not then able to give any substantial help on land. The maintenance of her sea and air power strained her resources, and, alone, the British had little hope of being able to make a serious military invasion of Europe. So the Germans evidently calculated that they could hold off Britain while they conquered Russia. Then, given time to organize the resources of all Europe, including Russia, in the service of their war-machine, they could out-build the rest of the world in aircraft and in ships, and so proceed with their plans of world conquest. To the nazis the scheme probably seemed both feasible and attractive. So they attacked Russia and, to their surprise, found themselves launched on a second great war.

What of Japan? Since the Meiji restoration, when Japan adopted Western methods, she has pur-

sued a steady policy of aggression. This has been very successful. After having annexed some groups of small islands without meeting any opposition, Japan attacked China in 1894 and gained Formosa, Korea, and Kwantung. The diplomatic intervention of Russia, France, and Germany compelled her to recede from her gains on the mainland. But when the German Navy Act of 1898 and German policy during the British South African War led Britain to look for support in the East, Japan entered into a limited alliance with Britain. So protected against a renewal of the coalition, she attacked Russia in 1904 and, aided by the incipient revolution in European Russia, compelled the Tsar's Government to surrender their gains of ten years earlier and also to admit some part of Japanese claims in Manchuria. Again, during the first world war, Japan took advantage of the pre-occupation of the Western powers to put forward even more extensive claims to Chinese territory and to authority in China. In 1931 she invaded Manchuria and, flouting the feeble remonstrances of the League of Nations, set up her puppet state of Manchukwo, whence, six years later, she invaded China Proper.

Such a record of successful aggression has, of course, convinced the rulers of Japan that aggression pays. It has paid them well up to the present. The whole nation was possessed by that belief, and an equally strong belief in their own ability to defeat the Western powers. Japanese success has been the result of a steady pursuit of a consistent national policy. That policy will not be abandoned except as the result of

decisive defeat in war. And Japan has not yet known military defeat in modern times.

Probably Japan, like Germany, is unable to make any correct estimate of the psychological factors in the make-up of the Western democratic nations, whose social inheritance is so completely different from her own. The Japanese Government mis-estimated both the British and the Americans as completely as the Germans did; though they fully accepted the maxim that one should study one's enemy, and had sent many of their ablest men to study our peoples. Evidently in December 1941 they calculated that their attack would turn the balance of war decisively against us, and that the United States could not organize her potential power in time to affect the result.

It is difficult for us to understand the calculations which led Japan to attack Britain and America at once—even while Britain was at war against Germany and Italy. One can only conclude that the Japanese accepted German propaganda at its face value, believed that Britain was already beaten, and decided to grab the East Indies before the Germans got them; and that they also believed that they must drive the United States out of the Far East, and thought the advantage to be gained by a surprise attack worth the price of bringing that country into the war at once. They did gain extensive territories and a strong position, which is, however, entirely dependent on their local naval and air supremacy in the Western Pacific.

By the middle of 1942 the Axis powers were in full possession of two great areas. In the West the

Germans held continental Europe, west of central Russia, from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. And to the south of the Mediterranean the Germans had effective control of the French and Italian territories in North Africa, which they have since lost. In the Far East the Japanese held an equally large and populous area, from Manchuria to the Solomon Islands and from Burma to the Aleutians, within which there are no neutral states.

But these two Axis domains are far apart. They can be linked by only three ways. Of these, the first, and most useful for any heavy traffic, is on the oceans which are held by the navies of the British and American Commonwealths. The second way lies across the territories of the Soviet Union. It is made effective by the trans-Siberian railways; but it is not open to traffic to or from Germany. The third possible route is the land- and air-ways across Asia south of the great mountains, through India, Iran, and Turkey. It seemed that one aim of the German drive to the south-east and the Japanese drive through Burma might be to gain command of this connecting route. If it was, they have failed to achieve it.

Each of these temporary Axis domains is a vast and wealthy region. But neither is yet self-sufficient. The Japanese domain contains a large and industrious population, numbering perhaps three hundred millions, and a wealth of natural resources which might enable them to make it self-sufficient, if they are allowed time to organize it. And there can be no doubt that this organization is being pushed on as fast as possible.

But it is a maritime empire, entirely dependent on control of the sea. When the Japanese lose the command of the sea their empire will fall to pieces.

The German domain is a land empire. It cannot be made self-sufficient. And the Germans can remember that they held all the essential parts of it during much of the war of 1914-18, and yet were destroyed by the blockade. Even at the crest of their success, in late June of 1940, the Germans were still shut in between the British blockade of the seaways and the Russian "wall" on their eastern border. Beyond each barrier lay the resources without which they could not hope to maintain their power—the wheatfields of the New World and the Ukraine, the oil of the Americas and of the Caucasus, the metals of the overseas lands and of the Soviet Union. To establish their empire on any lasting foundation they must break one of these barriers. But each is now far stronger than it was in 1940.

The German attack on Russia led to the prompt conclusion of an alliance between the British and the Soviet Union, and to the extension of the American lend-lease system to Russia from both the U.S.A. and Britain. Their conduct of war against a common enemy has brought these countries into closer touch and fostered a mutual admiration and sympathy among their peoples. And all this has given much more hope for their effective co-operation in the after-war world settlement than seemed possible before 1941.

But the present grouping of the powers presents

no clear or simple arrangement. On the contrary, it is an extraordinary tangle.

The group spoken of as "The United Nations" is at war against Germany and against most of the German client states. But even in this group the United States is not at war against Finland; the U.S.S.R. is at peace with Bulgaria; and the extent to which the several united nations are pledged to one another by definite treaties varies very considerably.

The four ABCD powers—American, British, Chinese, and Dutch—are at war against Japan. But the rest of the United Nations are not engaged in this eastern section of the world war. In particular the U.S.S.R. is still at peace with Japan.

Of the states not actively at war, several are non-belligerent; others are neutral. The majority of the American states in this group have broken off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, and are non-belligerent supporters of the United Nations. Spain and Sweden\* are in somewhat ambiguous relations with both sides. Perhaps Switzerland and Afghanistan are the only real neutrals.

So the wars involve the whole world. Therefore the after-war settlement must also concern the whole world. And since it is now evident that the fiction of complete sovereign independence is merely a fiction for any state, it is possible to hope that the democratic peoples will be willing to merge some part of their sovereignties.

\* Sweden has now, August 1943, cancelled the permission for German troops to travel on her railways.

To restore the pre-war conditions would be to restore the conditions which led up to the war. But the present conquests and war-time groupings are temporary; and it is too early to attempt to assess their lasting effects. The permanent geographical facts remain.

The last chapter, "IX—Summary and Conclusions," has been rewritten and extended; and part of Chapter III has been rewritten. Elsewhere the changes are small.

C. B. F.

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# I

## INTRODUCTION

THE whole argument of this book is based on the view that if our civilization is to continue some form of world unity must come; for the world is now the only possible final unit for the political and economic organization of mankind. Given a sane use of the natural resources of the whole world, now made available by the applications of science, and a just distribution of the products, the age of plenty can be made a reality, and with it the material conditions necessary for the realization of the brotherhood of man.

The developments of applied science within the last three hundred years have produced a change of scale in human affairs which has made it impossible for any part of the civilized world to remain isolated from the rest, or to be self-sufficient in all the natural resources needed by a modern civilized community. This change of scale has two closely related aspects, in industrial production and in transport and communications. Both depend on the chief fact which distinguishes the modern world from its medieval and ancient precursors: the discovery and the applications of sources of mechanical power infinitely greater than those controlled by any previous civilization.

All former civilizations depended on the manual power of human muscles, as in the slave basis of the



classical Mediterranean world and the serf basis of medieval feudal Europe, supplemented to varying extents by animal labour and, where natural conditions favoured it, by simple applications of wind- and water-power. Under these conditions by far the greater part of mankind was necessarily occupied in manual labour. The essential work involved in the production of food, clothing, shelter, and the simple tools with which these tasks were carried out, absorbed the energies of the majority for the greater part of their working life, and gave them in return a bare subsistence.

The surplus products supported only small classes who contributed to the organization of society (as rulers and administrators), to the knowledge necessary for its continuance and advancement (as medicine-men, priests, teachers, and investigators), and to the transformation and distribution of its products (as manufacturers and traders). These three, with the far more numerous class of directly productive workers, made the four classes of ancient and medieval societies. They appeared when man first settled down to agriculture in the neolithic ages; they crystallized in the four primary caste-groups of Hinduism; and until the last two centuries of the Atlantic world they seemed to form the inevitable and permanent framework of all civilized human society. There was practically no leisured class, no class without a useful function.

The chief line of human advance was in the improvement of the tools with which the work was done. So the paleolithic periods passed into the neolithic, and those into the ages of bronze and of iron, and later came steel,

which has been enormously elaborated and improved in our own generation. The recent discoveries and use of new metals and new alloys have made a change in our tool materials as great as that which made the transition from the bronze age to the age of iron. Each advance equipped the worker with better tools, and thus increased his efficiency as a producer, so that a greater amount of product could be obtained for a given expenditure of human energy. The same advance multiplied the number of the different materials needed. But, so long as the power behind the tools was limited to that of the muscles of men and animals, the burden of toil crushed down most of mankind.

The peoples of western Europe had the advantage of living in a region where three of the important natural resources for the simpler forms of power were more abundant than in the lands of the older civilizations. The climate gave more continuous vegetation, and thus allowed them to have more work-animals; it also gave them wind enough at all seasons to drive the ships on their seas and simple windmills on land; and the abundance of rain, combined with the absence of any long dry season, enabled them to have widespread small-scale water-power on their streams. Thus, when they had learned how to make use of these resources, they built up a society in which humans were freed from a large part of the necessary drudgery. These technical advances led to social changes; for the chattel slave and the galley slave were no longer needed, and those crude forms of compulsory labour slowly disappeared. They were replaced partly by serfdom and

partly by the organizations of craftsmen; both of which merged later into the wage system of modern capitalistic democracy.

The modern world began with the sudden expansion of the known world of Western Civilization. This came when its slowly accumulated knowledge and skill, particularly in the science of navigation, in shipbuilding, and in seamanship, led to trans-oceanic navigation, and so opened to it sea routes to the old world of the Indies and to the new world of the Americas. This gave a great stimulus to further investigation and exploration. The unsuitability of the oar-driven galley for long voyages and stormy seas concentrated maritime developments on to the sailing-ship; though not until the later development of the steamship made the galley unprofitable even in calm waters did the galley slave entirely disappear. The continued dependence on manual labour for most agricultural work and for some other forms of labour led to a revival of chattel slavery on land in the new countries, on a scale comparable to that of the ancient world. But among the peoples of the Atlantic margins of Europe, who were in the van of this period of advance, the access to more and more varied resources led rather to advances in the organization of labour, to the development of the factory system based on the division of labour, and to a readiness to search for and to try new tools and new methods of working.

An early result of the exchange of knowledge and goods was the introduction into the advanced Western countries of plants and methods of cultivation hitherto unknown there. This led to the agricultural revolu-

tion and its multiplication of the effective resources of their fields in both the quantity and variety of their crops. So England, which in the fifteenth century barely supported some three million people, could by the end of the eighteenth century support three times as many with a smaller proportion of its workers devoted to agriculture.

In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries came the invention of the steam-engine, which gave a new source of power for doing the necessary work of the world. Later came the successful use of coal in the smelting of iron. These made the mineral fuel rank high among important natural resources; so that the coal-beds, which had had but slight local value in previous centuries, became the material bases of an industrial power far greater than any known before. This increase in available power has changed the world to an extent hardly yet realized. A single modern battleship is able to apply far more power than the whole of the sixteenth-century "Invincible Armada" of Spain. The power regularly used in one large modern industrial plant may be greater than the total of the power available for all purposes in Elizabethan England.

Perhaps the most far-reaching of the changes is that in the proportion of human labour which must be devoted directly to the production of essential material goods. The populations of the "advanced" countries are now far better fed, clothed, and housed than were their recent ancestors before the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Yet the proportion of their working force given to the production of food and

shelter has steadily diminished. The number of agricultural workers has fallen to between a fifth and a fourth of all workers in most of these countries, perhaps a third as many as before; and it is now safe to say that not more than one-fourth of the workers of the world need be allotted to the production of these primary essentials, leaving the rest free for other work.

There has been a great increase in the number and proportion of the workers in secondary industries, concerned with the production of comforts and refinements which were formerly undreamt-of luxuries, and also of those engaged in work which is only indirectly productive, in the spread and advancement of knowledge, and in distribution and exchange of goods. These countries have also developed a leisured class which has had very great social influence. But the most important and hopeful change is that we no longer need to use the labour of children. On the contrary, we can give to them the labour of an increasing number of adults, as nurses and teachers and in the equipment and maintenance of educational work of all kinds. Thus it is now possible to make greater provision for the future of the race, as well as to provide a better standard of living.

In all these respects it is clear that the applications of mechanical power have caused so great a revolution in human affairs that the change of scale amounts to a change in kind. Our world is a different world from that of the pre-industrial periods; and it must needs be organized and controlled by different methods and for a more comprehensive end. The political and

social concepts and systems which were well adapted to the previous ages of small-scale, local, agricultural civilizations may be dangerous misfits to-day. They were developed in a world of scarcity, where man's use of natural resources was limited and crippled by his ignorance and his lack of mechanical power. Now his power resources are practically unlimited, he has accumulated a considerable body of useful knowledge which can be improved and increased by further investigation; and the problem before us is to organize the world for the age of plenty which has become a possibility.

Parallel with the changes in mechanical power are those in means of communication; though the two are so closely interwoven that they are rather two aspects of one fact. The application of the steam-engine to transport gave us the railway and the steamship. Later developments in the same direction have given us motor transport and good roads, and the developments of telegraphy and aircraft. The joint result is a change which has revolutionized the effects of distance on human affairs as much as mechanical power has revolutionized man's powers of production of goods.

These great developments have made the modern world, and distinguish it from the medieval and ancient worlds. They include also the means by which men record their thought and knowledge, and those by which men in different areas come into effective contact with each other and exchange ideas and goods. The same was true of earlier stages in civilization, all of which were marked by, and depended on, their

means of communication. Ancient Egypt was along the navigable Nile, and its civilization depended also on its written records. The Persian Empire was held together by its road system. The Mediterranean Sea became the focal area of Western Civilization as the development of sea-going vessels slowly spread, and knitted together, a common culture in all its marginal lands. The Roman road system spread with the empire and held its lands together in a coherent group; though only to the north-west did it reach much beyond the limits of the Mediterranean natural region.

The modern world was inaugurated by the beginnings of trans-oceanic navigation. This opened a new way to the Indies; and so made fresh and far greater contacts between the Western and Eastern Civilizations of the old world, and led to an interchange of ideas and a cross-fertilization which has stimulated and benefited all of them. It also opened to the peoples of the West the formerly unknown lands of the new world, in the Americas and in the southern hemisphere. This expansion of geographical horizons stimulated the mind of man to a similar, and even more far-reaching, expansion of other human horizons. It had been preceded, and ushered in, by the invention of printing, which made possible both greater accuracy of record and wider diffusion of knowledge than before.

The expansion of the known world of the West was preceded and accompanied in Europe by the mental and spiritual upheaval of the renaissance. That up-

heaval destroyed the last remnants of the Roman unity of the western world, which had survived in eastern and western sections as ecclesiastical and imperial unities. These were of varying efficiency in everyday life; but till the end of the Middle Ages they were of great importance in the concepts and cultures of Christendom. The Turkish conquests put an end to the remnants of the Eastern Roman Empire and scattered the Orthodox Catholics into separate fragments, some of which later became national churches. The Protestant reformation and the wars of religion equally shattered the unity of Latin Christendom and established in western Europe the concept of the independent sovereign state, in place of the shadowy traditional powers of Emperor and Pope; though the latter has survived with considerable authority and undiminished claims.

Thus the modern world began with an expansion to the limits of the habitable lands of the globe, and a repudiation of the thousand-year-old concept of political and religious unity which medieval Western Civilization had inherited from Rome. At the same time the lands at the focus of the ocean ways on the Atlantic margins of Europe suddenly became the areas of most active development; and the Mediterranean lands fell into the background. During the four centuries after da Gama rounded Cape Agulhas the Mediterranean Sea was a backwater, off the great world routes; and the leadership in civilization passed to the peoples round the Narrow Seas which lie between Britain and the mainland.



During the first half of this modern period, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, sea transport was on the whole much more efficient than land transport; and the greatest political and economic units which developed were the nation-states of the Atlantic margins of Europe. On land the effective range of their organization was limited by that of horse-and-foot communications along bad roads, which until the latter part of the seventeenth century were generally less efficient than those of the Roman Empire. On the seas their range was much greater; and they secured overseas possessions in many lands. These colonies were for the most part limited to small islands or coastal territories, except where the Spanish Conquistadores discovered the Aztec and Inca Empires, at a stage of cultural and political development similar to that reached round the eastern Mediterranean two thousand years earlier, and succeeded in making themselves masters in place of the former rulers. Only here, where there was already a well-developed organization, did the European overseas conquests extend over any considerable land areas before the eighteenth century.

In the second half of the period came the inventions which gave man command of greater mechanical power, in the steam-engine and its successors, and so caused the industrial revolution. This gave new means of communication, in new roads and vehicles, canals, the steamship, and the railway and telegraph, and very recently the radio and aircraft. These have so changed the scale of effective human organization,

especially in its economic and political relations, as to destroy all possibility of any real independence of small countries or groups of people.

Where there were in the eighteenth century only the beginnings of modern political organizations, these new tools led to the building up of economic and political units covering far larger areas than those of the preceding centuries (cf. Fig. 9, p. 41). So the United States of America extended over an area not much less than that of Europe, the Russian Empire spread over double that area, and the British Empire grew to include a quarter of the available lands of the world. Except in Central America and the West Indies, where there was only a slight development of the small units of the pre-steamship and pre-railway colonial period, the political units of the new world generally extend over far greater areas than do the states of Europe west of Russia. The political map of the world shows a striking contrast between, on the one hand, the two areas of small states, in Europe west of Russia and in Central America, and, on the other, the large states which occupy the rest of the land areas. Where they had room to expand, the growing states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries grew into the giant empires of the early twentieth century. In Atlantic Europe even small states such as Portugal and Holland, and later Belgium, acquired vast colonial empires. Only the Scandinavian states remained almost static in area; while Spain has lost its overseas empires in the Americas and the East Indies.

In the building up and consolidation of the giant

empires mechanical transport was of primary importance. The steamship, the railway, and the telegraph enabled the expanding powers to reach across oceans and continents and keep ever more distant territories within effective reach of their metropolitan lands. The aftermath of the war of 1914-18 saw a local, and perhaps only temporary, reversal of this trend in Europe by the establishment of several new and small independent nation-states at the expense of the break-up of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires and the contraction of the Russian and German empires. The two latter survived, with some change of rulers; and the revival of their expansionist imperialist policies with new political and military techniques was the immediate cause of the present war of 1939- .

The increase in man's power over nature, and the steady linking of the world into a single economic area, which have resulted from the developments of applied science and of the means of communication, both favour the trend towards economic and political expansion. At the present day considerably more than half the land and nearly half the population of the earth are under the flags of the four giant empires—British, Russian, French, and American. Another seventh of mankind is in the territories of the other three great powers—Germany, Japan, and Italy—whose homelands and peoples are comparable, in area and numbers, to those of the metropolitan countries of the British and the French.\* Among the rest only China, with a

\* Since this was written both France and Italy have ceased to be independent and have become, in different ways, dependencies of Germany for the duration of the war.

population variously estimated at from a sixth to a quarter of mankind, and Brasil are really large states. These nine together account for some six-sevenths of the lands and peoples of the world, leaving only one-seventh for the other forty or fifty smaller independent sovereign states. (See Figs. 1 and 2, pp. 14, 15, and Fig. 9, p. 41.)


The very existence of the giant empires is evidence of the fact that a dominant trend of our modern Western Civilization is towards the development of ever larger political groupings, and that distance has ceased to be a serious obstacle to such consolidation. If the trend continues, the end must be the union of the whole world into one state; and the question before us is: What form is such world union to take?

The great majority of historical precedents suggest the formation of a world empire by conquest, direct and indirect, and the resulting submission of all other peoples to the ruling class of a master folk. This was the method by which the classical world of Western Civilization became the Roman Empire. It was also applied with similar success in the contemporaneous worlds of the Indian and Chinese civilizations, and again in that of the Incas of South America. No one who has studied Prussian policy before 1914, and its revival in the nazi *Reich*, can doubt that this is now the policy of the rulers of Germany. The nazi philosophy casts the Germans for the role of the master race, or *Herrenvolk*, and aims to compel all others to submit to their rulers, the nazi leaders themselves.

Is any other form of world union possible? No

## INTRODUCTION

## I. RELATIVE AREAS OF THE CHIEF STATES (end of 1939)—approximate



The whole rectangle represents the area of the available land—50,000,000 sq. miles.  
 N.B.—(1) Mongolia, Sinkiang and Manchukwo are not included among Chinese Dependencies.  
 (2) Lands occupied by Germany after 1939 are not included.

FIG. 1.—RELATIVE AREAS OF THE CHIEF STATES. (Cf. Fig. 9, p. 41.)

## II. RELATIVE POPULATIONS OF THE CHIEF STATES (1939)

British Empire	Citizen Peoples	←----- Subject Peoples -----→	
	U.K.	←----- Indian Empire -----→	
China			
Russian Empire (U.S.S.R.)	Russians		Other peoples
American Empire (U.S.A.)	Citizen Peoples (Whites)		Subject Peoples
Japanese Empire	Japanese	Subject Peoples	←-in Manchukwo-→
French Empire	Citizen Peoples	Subject Peoples	
German Reich	Germans		Czechs & Poles
Italian Empire	Italians		Subject Peoples
Brasil			
All Other States			

The whole rectangle represents the total world population—2,000,000,000.

FIG. 2.—RELATIVE POPULATIONS OF THE CHIEF STATES.

other existed in any of the older civilizations. But within the last three hundred years some few peoples have developed a different kind of wide political union arising out of the democratic concept as it grew in northern and western Europe. The British and American Commonwealths are now the greatest of the democratic states. The latter has in its homeland a compact area and population comparable to those of the Roman Empire at its maximum extent. It was founded by the union of a group of small colonies established by men who left western Europe in search of freedom; and it spread mainly by further colonization. Its chief importance in this matter lies in that it has worked out a practical method of combining politically free men in a large state. All the democracies of the ancient and medieval worlds were small; only the empires could hold together large areas and numerous peoples. Now the American Commonwealth has shown that a democratic state can compare in size with a great empire. And the British Commonwealth shows that peoples and states separated by the widest oceans can hold together in a democratic system. Together the two offer evidence that a union of free peoples in democratic states is a practicable alternative to a world empire.

Since war has become totalitarian, civilization can no longer afford to devote its energies to the preparations for war, and the wars, which are necessary consequences of the existence of separate independent sovereignties. If it is to survive it must attain unity. Which alternative will be

adopted? A commonwealth of free peoples or an empire dominated by the finally successful conquerors? If our civilization is to endure, some such unity must be achieved; but whether it is to be commonwealth or empire, or whether man is to fail and go down to a new dark age and possible extinction is still doubtful.

NOTE ON COMPARING FIGURES 1 AND 2 (pp. 14 AND 15).

The relative populousness of each state shown can be seen by a comparison of its representation on these two diagrams.

Where it is shown larger on Figure 1 than on Figure 2 it is less populous than the world average. And *vice versa*.



## II

### THE GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS

THE most obvious, and not the least important, fact of the geographical distribution of the various natural resources on which man depends, and therefore of man himself, is its extreme unevenness. No country, and perhaps no continent, is able to produce all the materials, vegetable and mineral, which are required to maintain civilized life in the world of to-day.

This fact alone makes it impossible for any one country or region to be completely self-sufficient at the standards of living of the prosperous peoples of the modern world. The necessary material resources are too widely scattered. Thus it is quite impossible to divide the world into compartments in each of which the inhabitants can prosper independently of resources and happenings outside their own region. No area can be self-sufficient unless it extends into all types of climatic zones from cool-temperate to equatorial, and also includes all types of mineral resources.

The first need of human beings, as of other animals, is that of food; since without a sufficient and constant supply of food no man can carry on any work, useful or otherwise, or enjoy any leisure. Our food is all drawn from the surface of the earth and, except for the small proportion obtained from the sea, it comes directly or indirectly from the vegetation which grows on the land. Hence by far the most important of all

natural resources is the fertile land which is suitable for agriculture. From this viewpoint the lands may be classified into: (1) deserts, which can produce no important vegetation, (2) poor land, which is not suitable for agriculture but can support some grazing and forests, and (3) good land, the fertile areas capable of producing good crops.

The total area of the land available to man, excluding only the ice-covered lands near the Poles, is about fifty million square miles. Of this, two-fifths is desert because it lacks either sufficient summer heat or sufficient moisture, or both; and therefore it cannot support useful vegetation. The remaining three-fifths is climatically capable of supporting vegetation; but perhaps half of it is poor land, unsuitable for agriculture because of altitude, ruggedness, poverty of soil, marsh, or some combination of these disadvantages.\* In the deserts and on this poor land—that is, over some seven-tenths of the land surface—men are few and scattered in oases, in mining or lumber camps, on ranches or sheep stations, or in hunting or fishing encampments. On this seventy per cent. of the available land there dwell less than a tenth of mankind.

The remaining three-tenths of the land surface is good land, suitable for agriculture and for continuous settlement. This carries nine-tenths of the human race, and all the important centres of its civilizations. It is scattered among the other areas, often in small patches; but much of it is in a few large continuous areas

\* See "The Extent of the Cultivable Land," in the *Geographical Journal*, December, 1930.




FIG. 3.—CHIEF REGIONS OF GOOD LANDS IN THE TEMPERATE ZONES (AND INDIA).




FIG. 4.—WORLD—POPULATION DISTRIBUTION.

“a” marks densities below average. “b” marks densities above average.

of favourable climate. The larger areas of such habitable land are the important human regions of the world and the areas of development of its civilizations. They are indicated, for the temperate zones, on the accompanying map (Fig. 3, p. 20), and they stand out prominently on the population map of the world (Fig. 4, p. 21) as the large areas which have more than the average density of population. In them the landscapes are largely man-made. Elsewhere on the earth nature, left to herself, gives either wilderness or desert. Here, in these areas of long settlement, man has made his cultural landscapes of fields and orchards and woods, of village and town and city, all veined by the paths and roadways along which circulate the communications which hold together the world of man.

Four of these favoured areas are outstanding. The first and largest is "Europe," which as a habitable region is bounded by the zone of the mid-world deserts to the south and east and by a polar desert to the north. This region thus includes the habitable lands of northern Africa and western Asia as well as those of Europe in the more usual extension of that term. It is the north-western habitable section of the old world, lying around and between its two series of inland seas. On the opposite, south-eastern, edge of the mainland are the comparable but smaller regions of the Far East and India, separated from each other by the mighty mountain barriers of High Asia and their south-eastward extensions of jungle-clad mountains in Indo-China, and cut off from "Europe" by the mid-world deserts. In the new world is the corresponding

American region in the east of North America, south and east of the cold and dry limits of agriculture.

The corresponding climatic regions of the southern hemisphere are all small, because of the smaller areas of land in the south temperate zone ; and their total area is not more than that of the least of the three great northern regions. The fertile lands of the Hot Belt are of far less importance in the present stage of civilization ; and also it is generally true that the intertropical lands are regions of poor soil. There are striking exceptions to this last statement ; yet it is only on some alluvial and volcanic soils of south-east Asia and the East Indies, and near Lake Victoria and on the Upper Guinea lowlands in Africa, that there are large populous areas in the Hot Belt. These are in sum less extensive than any one of the great northern regions. So the chief habitable regions of the northern hemisphere are the major human regions. The following table summarizes the extent and population of these, and also of the climatically similar regions of the south.

Region.	Area, in Millions of Sq. Miles.	Popula- tion, in Millions.	Popula- tion per Sq. Mile.	Central Lati- tude.
<i>Northern :—</i>				
“ Europe ” . . . . .	2·8	520	186	50° N.
Eastern North America . . . . .	1·9	100	52	40° N.
“ Far East ” = East Asia . . . . .	1·7	500 ?	292	35° N.
India . . . . .	1·0	400	400	25° N.
<i>Southern :—</i>				
“ La Plata ” . . . . .	0·7	25 ?	36	35° S.
Eastern South Africa . . . . .	0·4	10	25	30° S.
South-eastern Australia and New Zealand . . . . .	0·4	9	23	35° S.

Before the great development of the means of communication which have made the modern age, these major human regions were isolated from each other, by sheer distance, for all but very small-scale and long-range intercourse; and therefore the peoples and cultures of each were effectively isolated and could evolve in comparative independence. Each of the three in the old world received on its desert margins the beginnings of civilization, which had arisen in the greater oases of the sub-tropical parts of the mid-world deserts; and in each this civilization was developed in adaptation to the distinctive geographical environment. So there grew up three great civilizations—in China, in India, and round the Mediterranean Sea. Each as it became strong spread outwards from its homelands till the Chinese culture dominated the Far East and the nearer valleys of High Asia, and spread south-westward to mingle with that of India. The Western Civilization spread west to the Atlantic, south to the great desert, and north to the climatic limits of agriculture at the edge of the polar wastes, so as to cover the whole of "Europe."

The caravan routes from oasis to oasis across the belt of the mid-world deserts enabled these sundered civilizations to keep up a faint contact with one another; this contact was much stronger between India and the West, by routes through the Near East,\* than from China to either "Europe" or India across High Asia. Also the coasting routes along the shores of the old world

\* This region, which has for a hundred years been logically termed Near East, is now termed Middle East by British political and military authorities.

from Norway to Japan with only one land-break at Suez, though often interrupted, gave another feeble link between these old-world civilizations. Yet before the modern age the contact was small and of little direct account in the everyday life of the masses of the people in any one of the three regions.

The discovery of the new world, and the subsequent colonization by Europeans of its then empty fertile lands in the temperate zones, have added the fourth area of comparable extent and natural resources to these three great regions of the old world, as well as the smaller southern regions. But here there have been no opportunities for the development of separate civilizations. The temperate lands of the new world in the western and southern hemispheres are part of the area of Western Civilization. Eastern North America is still much less populous than any one of the three old-world major human regions. It has been developed wholly since the establishment of trans-oceanic navigation and as a colony of Europe—chiefly of north-west Europe, with which it is connected by the shortest and most important of the great ocean routes. It has never been isolated from Europe, as the other major human regions were isolated from each other during the evolution of their civilizations.

These four major human regions together include the greater part of the good land of the north temperate zone, and nearly a third of the good agricultural lands of the earth. They also include about three-fourths of mankind. Thus they are far more important to man than all the rest of the lands, though their combined



area is barely an eighth of the total available land area. The three in the old world have each been occupied by civilized man for at least three to five thousand years, and so have had time to become fully peopled; the smallest of them, India, has a mean population density about ten times the world average. On the other hand, Eastern North America, which has been accessible to civilized man only during the past four hundred years and fully settled for less than a century, has only some fifty persons per square mile, which is but twenty-five per cent in excess of the average for all the available lands.

Each of these major human regions has associated with it outliers of good land which are culturally, and often politically, parts of it though not geographically continuous with it. Thus the habitable zone of Siberia, the great Nile oasis which is Egypt, and some other oasis lands of the mid-world deserts are outliers of "Europe." Similarly the habitable valleys of western North America are outliers of the major human region in the east of that continent, separated from it by mountains and arid lands. Outliers of Chinese and Indian civilizations reach towards High Asia and IndoChina; and it is difficult to draw any line between them, or between the Indian and the Western culture areas.

Nowhere outside these major human regions are there any other areas of comparable importance to man. The three in the north temperate zone contain the homelands of all the great powers and the metropolitan countries of all the colonial empires.\* Hence

\* Except in so far as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa have colonial dependencies.

the rest of the world is dependent on them for most of its political, economic, and cultural organization and development. Only in Latin America is there any large area which is even nominally independent of all these major regions; and its independence is only political, not economic or cultural. Thus it seems reasonable to consider the problems of world organization primarily in relation to these three northern major human regions and the states in them, with their dependencies. If they can agree, the rest of the world must follow their lead.

The fifty million square miles of available land is, like all lesser natural resources, distributed very unevenly. Six-sevenths of the habitable land is on one half of the surface of the globe (see Fig. 8, p. 38). Nearly two-thirds of it is in one great land mass, including Europe, Asia, and Africa, which may fairly be termed Mainland, since it is the ultimate mainland in relation to all other land areas on the globe. The next largest land mass—North America—is nearly a quarter as large. After that ranks South America, and then Australia, with areas which are respectively less than a fifth and a tenth of that of Mainland. These four land masses include more than nineteen-twentieths of all the available land. Of the remainder, half is in the great island group of the East Indies, and the rest includes such islands as Madagascar, the British and Japanese archipelagoes, and the uncounted small oceanic islets. The relative importance of the chief land masses is indicated in the diagrams (Figs. 5 and 6, pp. 28, 29), which clearly show the dominance of Mainland.




FIG. 5.—RELATIVE AREAS OF THE CHIEF LAND MASSES. THE POLAR REGIONS ARE NOT INCLUDED.  
(Figures indicate area in millions of sq. miles.)

The size of Mainland, and the position and extent of its mountains, prevent the rain-bearing winds from the oceans from reaching far into it, except where the westerly winds penetrate from the Midland Ocean into Siberia along the great lowland. Therefore most of the interior is arid desert, or semi-arid poor land, relieved only where it contains mountains high enough to wring




FIG. 6.—RELATIVE POPULATIONS OF THE CHIEF LAND MASSES.  
(Figures indicate population in millions—round numbers.)

some moisture from the parched atmosphere and send it down to form oases at their feet. Round the desert areas are wide, but very irregular, zones of semi-arid scrub- and grass-lands. These interior deserts link up at one end with the tropical deserts in south-west Asia, and at the other with the polar deserts in eastern Siberia, to form across Mainland a continuous series, which has been called the mid-world deserts. The approach of these deserts to the coasts of the Indian Ocean cuts the

humid, and therefore habitable, areas of Mainland into three separate marginal regions, each of which is sufficiently penetrated by rain-bearing winds at some season to have a rainfall adequate for agriculture. These three regions of sufficient rain are "Europe," Africa south of the Sahara, and Monsoon Asia. Of them, Monsoon Asia is divided by mountains into the two separate habitable regions of India and the Far East; and the African region is almost wholly in the Hot Belt, and is therefore less populous and less important than the others (cf. Fig. 4, p. 21).

In Mainland north of the Sahara and the equatorial regions of Asia—i.e., in the old world which was known to civilized men before the age of discovery—the major human regions of Europe and of Monsoon Asia are marked off from the barren lands which separate them by their accessibility as well as by climate. They are the regions of open coasts, of many peninsulas and coastal islands, of sea inlets and long navigable rivers; in terms of transport they are lands of the waterways, whose main populous areas and population centres are accessible by water. In the centre and north of Mainland, inland from "Europe," India, and China, lies Mackinder's "Heartland,"\* the region of arctic and continental drainage whose rivers do not flow to the open seas, so that they are not directly

\* See Sir Halford Mackinder's *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, London, 1919 (reissued, 1942). This work has not been widely read in this country; but it has had considerable influence in Germany. The facts it sets out and discusses have little appeal to a democracy which wishes only to live in peace; but they are fundamental to the powers which aim at world conquest, and therefore also to statesmen who desire to plan for enduring peace.

accessible by water—not open to the “shipmen.” Its external communications were wholly on the landways before the introduction of the airplane.

These continental divisions of Mainland are comparable in extent to the three outlying continents. In area and natural resources North America is almost a fourth of Mainland; though at present it is barely a tenth as populous. It is the only one of the minor continents which is in similar latitudes to the old-world regions of Mainland, to which it shows a striking similarity in its natural divisions; though the proportions are different. The polar wastes extend over northern Canada and Alaska. The fertile lands of the eastern United States and Canada are closely comparable in area and in climate to those of China and Manchuria. The belt of the mid-world deserts is reproduced, on a much smaller scale, by the arid and semi-arid areas from Lower California through the Great Basins and the High Plains to Alberta, where it just fails to link up with the sub-arctic Barrens. It is, however, on the west coast that the difference of scale is most marked; for California has less than a tenth of the extension of the comparable “Mediterranean” region of Mainland; and the lower lands of Washington, Oregon, and British Columbia bear a similar proportion to Europe north of the Alps. Thus all North America is dominated by its one major human region, while Mainland contains three such regions. The other continents have too little land in the temperate zones to develop any comparably large regions of this type.

The interior region of Mainland, the “Heartland,”

was defined by Mackinder in two ways.\* The physical definition first stated is "the area of continental and arctic drainage." This is quite definite; but it includes all the Caspian basin. The western half of this is clearly part of our "Europe," and its chief river, the Volga, is now so interlinked by canals with the other waterways of Russia that its basin is almost part of the European coastlands. In so far as the summer navigation of the Russian Arctic has linked the Siberian rivers with the West those coastlands are further extended, and the "Heartland" diminished. But even in its narrowest limits the "Heartland" is a vast region, though most of it is arid or semi-arid, and so incapable of maintaining a large population.

But if, with Mackinder,† we extend this "Heartland" to include, for strategic and political purposes, all the area which is so placed that a locally dominant land power can exclude any sea power from it, then its western boundary must be placed much farther to the west. The Turkish Straits and the sea-entrances to the Baltic can hardly be forced by any naval power against a first-class land power in command of their shores; and so the lands drained to the Black and Baltic seas, as well as to the Caspian, are added. Probably it is truer, on strategic grounds, to regard these areas—i.e. eastern and much of central Europe—as a debatable land between the oceanic and "Heartland" influences, with that of the seas diminishing eastwards.

\* *Op. cit.*; and see also F. J. Teggart's "Geography as an Aid to Statecraft," in the *Geographical Review*, 1919; Vol. VIII, pp. 227-242.

† *Op. cit.*, Chapter IV.

The "Heartland" has in the past been the original home and recruiting ground of great hordes which have invaded and conquered large areas of the fertile marginal regions. The Huns reached far west into Europe; and the Tatars dominated Russia till late in the Middle Ages. Persians and Afghans and Mughals in turn raided and conquered much of India, and Mongol and Manchu invaded and ruled China. But none of the great empires so founded maintained its strength from the "Heartland." Those which lasted for more than one or two generations based their power on the natural resources of the fertile marginal regions, where alone there is an adequate food basis for the man-power necessary to an empire. The peoples of each one of the fertile major human regions greatly outnumber any population that can be nourished in the "Heartland"; they have usually had a higher development of civilization; and only when they are themselves disunited and disorganized need they fear invasion from the poorer lands. The "Heartland" is not, and under modern conditions cannot be, the dominant region on its own resources; but its central position ensures that no empire can rule Mainland unless it includes the "Heartland."

Although invaders from the "Heartland" have at times ruled in all three of the coastland major human regions, the reverse attack has been made only from east or west, never from the south. At its maximum extension the Chinese Empire just reached the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea; and, though at that distance its grasp was but feeble, its successors long held, and still claim, a more or less shadowy suzerainty over



much of central and High Asia. In modern times the effective thrust has been eastward from Russia. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while the seamen of the Atlantic states of Europe were exploring and conquering beyond the oceans, the Cossacks carried the empire of the Tsars eastward along the great lowland to the Pacific coasts and across Bering sea to Alaska. In the nineteenth century this empire was pushed southward, in the east to the Amur and Vladivostok (1858), and in the west to the borders of Afghanistan (1887); while in the last twenty years it has advanced in the centre to include Outer Mongolia and to dominate Sinkiang (eastern Turkestan). So the Russian power now rules more than a quarter of Mainland, including most of the "Heartland," from its base in the debatable land of East Europe.

This eastward expansion followed from the fact that the "Heartland" is most accessible on its western side. It is shut off from India by the highest mountains and plateaus of High Asia. From China it is accessible only by narrow routes across the deserts north of those plateaus. But to the west no serious barrier divides it from Europe. The more important parts of it are parts of the great lowland which extends eastward from the Atlantic shore of Europe to the mountains of central Asia and east Siberia. When the advance of science had added the railway and aircraft to other tools of conquest it was inevitable that the "Heartland" should fall to the West.

The greater routes of human movement and traffic on the earth are those which connect the more populous

regions. In the modern world these are mainly on the seas, where the only effective barrier is formed by the polar ice-caps. On land the chief barriers are the greater mountain ranges and deserts. The chief land routes come down to the ocean shores in the fertile lowlands; and the bulk transport routes connecting these populous regions are on the seaways.

Thus the distribution of the lowlands in relation to the oceans is a prime fact in the determination of the chief routes, and so of the focal areas in which such routes converge. The greatest continuous lowland on the earth is that which occupies most of Europe and the north-west quarter of Asia. It is bounded on the north by the Arctic Sea; and its northern fringe is part of the polar wastes. To the east and south it is shut off from the Monsoon coastlands by High Asia, across which there is no easy route-way. To the south-west, towards the Mediterranean, there are gaps in the mountain belt; but only to the west does this great lowland open freely to the seas, in the gap between the highlands of central Europe and of Scandinavia. Here is the "Ocean Gate of the Great Lowland"; and here across the gateway lies the island of Great Britain, a transverse breakwater six hundred miles long, sheltering the lowland coast from the storm waves of the ocean and compelling all sea-borne traffic to defile either to north or south of the island.

There is a remarkable convergence of important natural routes and chief traffic ways of Europe towards the southern part of the North Sea. This area is itself part of a long, shallow depression in the rocks of the

earth's crust, which extends for two thousand miles in a west-south-west to east-north-east direction, between the ancient highlands of Britain and Scandinavia to the north-west and those of central Europe to the




FIG. 7.—CONVERGENCE OF EUROPEAN ROUTWAYS.

(The shading marks land more than 3,000 feet above sea-level.)

south-east.\* The lowest areas in the bottom of this downfold are flooded by the waters of the English Channel and the North, Baltic, and White Seas, separated by only the low isthmuses of Slesvig-Holstein and

\* The "nordic" downfold between the caledonian and the armorican-variscan upfolds.

Karelia. The North Sea is also connected with the ocean by the break between the Scottish and Norwegian sections of the caledonian highlands. All the lowlands north of the Alps slope down towards this depression; it receives most of the rivers which drain the European part of the great lowland; and these rivers and their valleys lead the traffic routes to it. The convergence of routes is further emphasized on the waterways by the defile of Dover Strait (see Fig. 7, p. 36).

On the opposite shore of the North Atlantic lies the second largest continuous lowland of the world—that of North America east of the Rockies. The northern part of this lowland is occupied by the polar wastes, and its western edge on the High Plains is in the semi-arid belt; but its humid portion is the American major human region. It is like the great lowland of the old world in that its northern shores are permanently ice-blocked. In the south it opens to the sea in the tropical Gulf of Mexico. On the east the St. Lawrence entry is ice-blocked for five months of the year, and hampered by fog at other seasons; so that the more important eastern entry is the one by the Hudson-Mohawk gap from New York; and here is the nearest American parallel to the European area of convergence of routes in the south of the North Sea. It is an important fact of geography that both these great lowlands open to the Midland Ocean, and turn their backs to the Outer Ocean from which they are cut off by wide mountain belts (see Fig. 8, p. 38, and Fig. 3, p. 20).

Of the oceans, the Atlantic is the one which offers the most direct connections between fertile but widely differ-




FIG. 8.—THE LAND HEMISPHERE.

This map is drawn on an azimuthal equal-area net. The areas shown include 99% of the habitable land.

ing climatic regions. It stretches through all the zones between the polar regions. Hence the north-south ocean routes, along which takes place the interchange of products of tropical and temperate regions, are best developed on the Atlantic; and the most important of these routes meet those of the great lowland in the ocean gate of Europe.

This focal area has a further advantage arising from its central position among the lands of the globe, which is illustrated on the accompanying map (Fig. 8, p. 38). The map is centred on London, which is near the centre of the land hemisphere—that is, the half of the earth's surface containing the greatest amount of land. This hemisphere, included in the circle drawn on the map, contains six-sevenths of the available land of the globe, though that land occupies a little less than half of its area. The opposite, water, hemisphere has only a seventh of the available land, which occupies less than a twelfth of its area. In the land hemisphere the North Atlantic is the "Midland Ocean"; and the chief lands of Western Civilization are round its shores, as those of the classical world were round the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. But the expansion from the riverine areas of early civilization to the Mediterranean world, and thence to the Atlantic lands, cannot be repeated to any new regions; for more than half of all the available lowlands of the earth slope down to this Midland Ocean and its marginal seas. Thus this central focal area of the land hemisphere is the chief focal area of the world. These lands round the southern part of the North Sea occupy the most central position in the great routes of the

world. Since these routes were made available by the development of ocean navigation, and made really effective by the steamship and the railway, the peoples of these lands have been the leaders in civilization; and the modern economic and cultural unity of the world is mainly centred here.

The importance of this focal area is emphasized by the fact that the major human region of Europe is the largest and most populous of those regions, and is also the most centrally placed among the four. Also the similar American region is separated from, and united to, Europe by the short ocean route which leads directly from its chief focus about New York; \* and this is the busiest of all the ocean highways. Its importance has also been extended by the Suez and Panama Canals, which have given it more and more direct waterways from the Midland Ocean to the Outer Ocean.

The geographical distribution of the great powers is closely related to that of the fertile lands of the north temperate zone. Five of the seven† have their metropolitan countries in Europe, and one each in America and in East Asia. A survey of the distribution of the lands of the seven great powers shows that six of them have their vital areas each in one part of the land surface. The Soviet Union occupies a compact and continuous land area, which is also continuous with its

\* The area along the " Fall Line " from Boston to Washington, with New York near its centre, contains a fourth of the population of the United States on a hundredth part of its area. It is the chief focal area of America, though it has less natural nodality than the European focus.

† At present three of the five; since France and Italy are not now independent great powers.




FIG. 9.—WORLD—POLITICAL MAP OF THE GIANT EMPIRES (1939).



dependent territories. The states of the American Commonwealth are equally compact and continuous; though their dependencies are overseas from them. The French Empire has nearly seven-eighths of its lands in France and in north and west Africa from the Mediterranean to the Congo, in a block which is severed only by the sea between France and Algeria. It is less continuous than the Russian lands, or those of the American Commonwealth; but this main area lies wholly in the west of the Eurafrikan land mass. Italy is a Mediterranean power, with a recent extension of its territory beyond Suez (now lost). Japan is wholly in East Asia, and Germany in central Europe.\*

The outstanding exception to this general scheme of continuity, or close grouping, of territories is the British Empire. Both the commonwealth and the dependencies are widespread round the shores of all the oceans. Seven-eighths of its lands and peoples fall into two great regions, round the North Atlantic and the Indian Oceans respectively; but in each the grouping is oceanic rather than continental. The British Empire is the geographically discontinuous empire. Every great empire of the past, and every other great power of the present, had and has its main area and resources in one great land region. The British Empire, in contrast, is the oceanic empire whose lands and peoples are round all the oceans and whose linking routes are on the seaways.

In regard to the possible development of political

\* As elsewhere in this book, the reference is to the areas as they were in 1939.

groupings wider than those of existing states and empires, there is a general tendency to think in terms of land regions—an East Asian empire for Japan, a United States of Europe, a Pan-American union, and various “regional” groupings, by which is meant groupings of contiguous states, within or without the League of Nations. Only some of the British have thought in terms of oversea groupings dependent on the use of the seaways; and it has been left to an American, C. K. Streit, in his *Union Now*, to focus attention on the fact that in the world of to-day the actual effective grouping for every-day intercourse and community of ideals and ideas is not necessarily, or primarily, by the landways.

The Lands of the North Atlantic are a “region” within which there is at least as much similarity of climate and natural resources as there is in either Europe or the Americas, and probably more kinship of cultural development. Hence it is possible to conceive a grouping which is not limited to one continental land mass. The democratic states are grouped round the North Atlantic, except for their outliers in Australia and New Zealand at the antipodes of that ocean; and an Atlantic Union is as feasible now as a Mediterranean Empire was in the Roman period. Also these lands round the Midland Ocean include the central land areas of the world, round which the rest may be grouped.

Most of the proposals for wider groupings of competing states have started from the obvious suggestion—obvious at least to a landsman—that the first step is to form each of the major human regions into a

single state, either a federal commonwealth or an empire. India is already one empire, and as such a part of the British Empire, and in transition from the status of a dependency to that of a dominion or an independent state. The Japanese attempt to conquer China, if successful, would make an empire of the Far East with no direct political connections with any other major region, but with ambitions for further expansion. The American Commonwealth has already achieved a democratic federal union which includes most of eastern North America; it is easy to imagine this extended over the whole of that region by the incorporation of the provinces of Canada as states of the union, since such a political change would make little difference to the every-day life of the ordinary man and woman in either of those countries. For the fourth, and the largest, most populous and most important of the major human regions, "Europe," such union seems more remote, though it has often been suggested as a way out of its difficulties. It is quite clear that the dominant and consistent aim of German imperialism, under the Hohenzollerns and the nazis alike, is the conquest of neighbouring lands and the unification of Europe into one empire which would be based on, but not limited to, Europe. As an alternative to this fate many democratic writers, and some statesmen, have suggested a United States of Europe (U.S.E. is a glib parallel to U.S.A.) on some more or less democratic federal basis.

Such a division of the world into three or four super-states, each based on one of the major human regions,

would be as likely to postpone as to advance the establishment of a World Commonwealth. Far from eliminating war, it might increase the scale and destructiveness of wars, by increasing the powers of the antagonistic states and the greatness of the prizes to be fought for, without lessening the causes of conflict. How long would it be before a Japanese Empire of East Asia attempted the conquest of India, or of Australia?

Those who aim to build a World Commonwealth must, from the first beginning, attempt to overstep the limits of any one of these regions and include at least parts of all or most of them. The commonwealth is to be a world union, not merely a regional group. The place to begin is in the chief focal area. Here already converge the homelands of three of the leading peoples—British, French, and Germans—as well as those of some of the more important of the smaller nations. Near to, and equally convergent towards, this centre are the Scandinavian and Baltic lands and Switzerland. Three other great peoples—Italians, Russians, and Americans—also converge towards it in so far as the most populous areas of their homelands and their chief routes of contact with the rest of the world are directed towards it. For all the lands and peoples of Western Civilization this is the one suitable central area.

### III

#### UNITED(?) EUROPE

“ EUROPE ” is not only the largest and most populous of the major human regions and the homeland of Western Civilization, it is also the most complicated area in its political geography. It includes the metropolitan countries of five of the seven great powers, and more than a score of smaller states which were before 1938 counted as independent sovereign states.\* Thus in Europe alone there were nearly half of the independent sovereign states of the world—a proportion which indicates the relative politico-geographical fragmentation of that sub-continent.

The core of Europe is the massive peninsula which stretches westward, between its two groups of inland seas, for a thousand miles from the broad isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas towards the Atlantic Ocean. This peninsula is some six hundred miles wide from the Baltic to the northern gulfs of the Mediterranean, and no part of it is as much as five hundred miles from the sea. To the east of it is the broad lowland of East Europe, an ill-defined part of the continent, and radiating from it in other directions are

\* Numbers refer to the position before 1938. Since then Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, CzechoSlovakia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, JugoSlavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Romania have ceased, at least for a time, to be independent.

the smaller peninsulas and islands which are the more maritime parts of the European region.

East Europe is the south-western part of the lands of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics; and it contains the populous, and therefore important, part of those lands. Its western boundary is in the broad isthmus which connects it with central Europe. Since September, 1939, the western boundary of the Soviet Union has been pushed forward in this area, and the land boundary considerably shortened in the process. The bends in the boundary line thus established give it a length of nearly twelve hundred miles, in front of a straight line of only eight hundred miles from Riga to Odessa. In the border zone the only important natural barriers are the Pripet Marshes and a section of the Karpathian Mountains. South of the Baltic Sea this border marks off the areas which received their Christianity and much of their civilization from Greek Byzantium and Latin Rome respectively during the Middle Ages. It may be noted here that the Baltic lands were associated with those round the North Sea to form Protestant Europe, which is, or was, essentially the coastlands of the northern group of inland seas.

The smaller peninsulas and islands which fringe the peninsular core of "Europe" fall into seven distinct groups of lands. Five of these are parts of the historic Europe; the other two are not usually so regarded. They are the Atlas lands of North Africa, islanded between the Mediterranean Sea and the great desert, and the fertile lands of south-western or Mediterranean Asia. Of the five, the south-eastward Balkan peninsula

is wide open to central Europe, from which it is not marked off by any physical frontier zone. It also approaches closely to the Turkish peninsula, whose land connection with the rest of Europe is east of the Black Sea. To the south the smaller Italian peninsula is hardly more clearly separated by the base of the Apennines; for the north Italian plain is part of central Europe. To the south-west the more massive Iberian peninsula is clearly separated by the Pyrenees. To the north, Scandinavia is almost insular beyond the southern part of the Baltic Sea; but the Danish Straits are both narrow and shallow, and are also ice-bound in severe winters, while Jutland is continuous with the mainland. Only Britain to the north-west is completely insular. Near Dover it approaches within twenty miles of the mainland; but this narrow strait is also short, so that thirty miles away from the narrowest part the width reaches sixty miles. Yet for three hundred miles to the west and a hundred to the north-east from Dover Strait the Narrow Seas are little more than a hundred miles wide.

The German lands occupy more than a third of the area of this peninsular core of Europe. They lie in the centre and north of the peninsula, from the Alps to the North and Baltic Seas, and from the Ardennes and the Jura eastwards to a very ill-defined border zone along a line from the head of the Adriatic Sea northward to the Baltic, with three projecting tongues east of this line—one along the coastlands of the Baltic to the Soviet border, a second up the valley of the Oder towards the fertile lands of the Karpathian fore-

land, and the third down the Danube valley and along the Alpine foreland towards the lowland of Hungary. Partly enclosed between the first two are the Poles; while the Czechs are almost surrounded by the second and third of these eastward projections of Germans.

The medieval "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" occupied most of the same central area of Europe, from the Adriatic to the Baltic, during the whole of its thousand years. Its western boundary was pressed back by the rise of France and the Netherlands, and its eastern frontier was pushed eastwards by conquest and colonization beyond the Elbe and Enns rivers. This colonization never extended south farther than the upper valleys of southward-flowing Alpine rivers; though the medieval empire included most of Italy, and Austrian Germans ruled in parts of north Italy till the middle of the nineteenth century. A re-establishment of that empire would push its limits south to include Sicily.

The central areas and important states of medieval Germany were in the basins and low plateaus of the Central Highlands north of the Alps, in the Rhinelands, Bavaria, Saxony, and Austria. But the modern German Empire has developed from Brandenburg-Prussia in the North German plain. This is a part of the great lowland, without any distinct physical limits either eastward or westward. A state on this plain could have no security other than the strength of its armies, since it had no natural defences; and the growth of Prussia depended wholly on its military and political



successes. Among the several states which arose on this lowland, Prussia has been, throughout the modern period, more frequently efficient than the others; and it grew at their expense. Its growth was aided by the agricultural revolution in western Europe which introduced new methods of cultivation and new plants, including the potato. This made it possible to grow more food and support a larger population and more soldiers for the king; and so it gave Prussia equality in numbers with the more fertile, though smaller, states of central and south Germany. Prussia also had the fortune to be ruled continuously throughout this period till 1918 by the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns, which pursued a consistent policy of aggrandizement. Its most prominent and characteristic king was Frederick the Great. By the end of the Napoleonic wars Prussia was the dominant state in north Germany and in possession of the Rhineland industrial region.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century the Germans have become the most numerous people in the European peninsula. They are now nearly twice as numerous as the French, and slightly more than the total of all the smaller peoples on their borders—Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, and Swiss. They are also double the numbers of the Italians, or of the whole group of the Balkan peoples. So that, though they form less than half of the population of central Europe, the Germans are by far the largest national group in that peninsula. They have also the military advantage of a central position among

their smaller neighbours, with easy access to all of them, and are at present the best-organized people in Europe; thus an ambitious ruler of Germany is well placed to attempt the conquest of those neighbours. Most of this central peninsula of Europe was politically united for a few years under the suzerainty of Napoleon I.\* Its western half formed the empire of Charlemagne more than a thousand years ago, and the memory of that incomplete unification has haunted the day-dreams of ambitious rulers ever since.

In spite of the extreme political fragmentation of "Europe," its physical geography offers no serious obstacles to its effective economic and political unification, with to-day's means of communication. Its greatest mountain system, the Alps, is passable in many places; and it contains no wide deserts. Of the two series of inland seas which penetrate it, the northern reaches in for fifteen hundred miles from the Channel to the head of the Baltic and gives easy access to lowland shores and navigable rivers which link up all northern and central Europe north of the Alps. The southern group of inland seas extends for three thousand miles from Gibraltar to Batum, and, though most of its shores are mountainous, it links up the lands of southern and eastern Europe; while the great rivers which flow to the Black Sea give easy connections with central and eastern Europe. Europe is less broken up by physical barriers than is China; and its lack of political and economic unity is now maintained by human obstacles alone, not by natural

\* As it is now, 1941- , under that of Herr Hitler.

barriers to intercourse between its several countries. "Europe" is a permanent regional division of the habitable world; none of its present political divisions can claim that status.

But there are many natural barriers which were sufficient to hinder easy contact among the several peoples of Europe in the past, and so favoured the development of the linguistic groups which have become the separate nations. At the beginning of the modern period many of the stronger feudal rulers welcomed the break-up of the medieval unity and the beginnings of the nation-states, because it gave to each of them complete supremacy and independence within his own state. There was left no power able to overawe them; and Europe developed a group of independent sovereign states \* dwelling in an international anarchy modified only by customs and conventions, often dignified by the name of international law, which could not be enforced against any strong state.

Since then there have been many proposals for the formation of a European union; but not until the developments of mechanical transport in the nineteenth century brought the countries into close contact did the forces in favour of union acquire any great strength. Since the war of 1914-18 such proposals have received attention from a wider public in Europe; but the feelings in favour of union are still much weaker than the patriotic hatreds which keep the nations apart.

\* The principle was recognized in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), at the end of the Thirty Years' War and of the unity of medieval Western Christendom.

Yet it is worth while to consider some of the conditions which affect the attainment of such a union. If it is to take the form of an empire, in which one of the states establishes an effective suzerainty over the rest, it can only be the result of conquest; and the only states now in a position to aim at unity in this form are the German and the Russian. That conquest is the aim of the present nazi Germany, as it was of the Hohenzollern *Reich* in 1914 and of the France of Louis XIV and Napoleon I. In each case it roused the opposition of other peoples and states, and led to the formation of a strong alliance against the would-be conqueror. Napoleon, after Tilsit (1807), seemed nearer to success than either of his successors has yet come; though the expansion of Germany during the eight years 1933-41, by threat of war and by war, had extraordinary successes. Russia had similar success on her western borders in the last quarter of 1939.

The unification of Europe into one empire by these methods seems improbable; though it is by no means inconceivable. The aggressor states are not likely to combine to make one of themselves master; since the successful aggressor would certainly reduce his allies to the status of vassals. Neither Italy nor Russia could retain any real independence against a completely successful Germany; already Herr Hitler has expressed his desire to rebuild the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, as well as to conquer the Ukraine. A German Empire of Europe, if once established, would be the most powerful state on the earth; for it would have as its geographical base the largest,

richest and most populous of the major human regions. Its rulers would inevitably seek to extend their dominion over Africa, most of which is already subject to European states, and the other continents. It would be a preliminary stage to a world conquest.

From such a base in "Europe" a European Empire could reach the whole of Mainland by land- and airways, and its nearby islands across narrow seas. Nowhere would it need to cross any wide ocean and thus expose its communications to the sea powers. And nowhere on Mainland would it meet a power actually or potentially equal to its own, either in natural resources or in developed industrialism. But Mainland includes two-thirds of the land and other natural resources of the earth, and four-fifths of all mankind. If all this were organized by a single predatory empire what chance of independence could remain to any one of the three minor continents? Is it not clear that to save freedom anywhere in the world it must first be saved in Europe?

All alternative methods of uniting the states of Europe, or of any large part of it, depend mainly on the voluntary union of a number of independent peoples into some form of federation. A line of advance which seemed hopeful during the interval between the great wars, 1918-39, was the strengthening of the links between the states which were members of the League of Nations and the development of that group of states into a union. All the tentative advances in that direction failed because the League was a league of sovereign states, and not a union of

peoples. It was essentially an association of governments, each chiefly interested in the maintenance of its own power and importance; and its assembly and council were composed of delegates of those governments. There was no direct representation of the peoples, and no member government showed any willingness to give up any part of its claims to independent sovereignty, or to keep the pledges of the Covenant where doing so involved any risk. And its leading members regarded the League chiefly as a tool to be used in their own interests. The League had no power to prevent war. Its promise of collective security was a mirage.

Yet it is now more evident than ever before that it is only in union that the peoples of the smaller states can hope to find any security for their liberties, in face of the threats of conquest by the few powerful and aggressive states. Only the strong can be free. The events of 1938-41 have amply demonstrated that no small people is secure in its liberties while the present European anarchy continues. Under present conditions no people can hope to remain free unless it is both able and ready to defend its freedom against would-be conquerors. None of the smaller states can hope to do this alone; hence there are now strong forces urging their peoples towards union.

A voluntary union can be made only on the basis of agreed principles. Unless a clear majority of the active citizens, in each state which enters into such a union, are agreed on the fundamental principles on which it is to be based the union cannot endure. And in present-day Europe there are three or four distinct and incompatible political ideologies, or con-

cepts of human relations in political groupings. Each of these is nominally dominant in at least one state; but all of them are held by some people in most of the states, and so may appear as minority views in any state in which they are not dominant if that state tolerates or cannot wholly suppress such minorities.

In so far as they are conscious of their political principles the democratic peoples are at one in holding that the primary unit of political organization is the free adult human being, and that the state exists for man, not man for the state. This is ostensibly the dominant view, the one which is publicly and officially approved, in all those countries which are spoken of as the democracies. In Europe these included, before 1938, Belgium, Britain, CzechoSlovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, and perhaps some other states whose written constitutions are in principle democratic even though their practice was authoritarian.\* Except for CzechoSlovakia, which is isolated in central Europe, the democratic states form a continuous group in the west and north-west of the continent, ranged round the North Sea. Of all the states bordering the North Sea only one—Germany—is not a democracy.

In central and south Europe lie the two great totalitarian states of Germany and Italy, governed by despots who are necessarily enemies to all democracies. Here the declared philosophy of the state is

\* Four of the ten European democracies named above were republics and six constitutional monarchies; so that both these methods of appointing the formal head of the state are clearly compatible with this form of government.

that of autocracy, complete submission to the will of the leader (Führer or Duce), who is the embodiment of the state and in whom its power is focused. These leaders seized power for its own sake, and their encouragement of state-worship is a means of maintaining power by a rationalization of their own claims and of the motives of their supporters. The two states are in an uneasy alliance, as the Berlin-Rome Axis. This alliance arose only because each of them felt a need for support; and it will come to an end when they are defeated or as soon as either of the leaders succeeds in his aims of conquest, when he will reduce his ally to the status of a dependency, in fact if not also in form.\* At present this alliance is supported by Japan, which bases its political life on similar principles with a divine "leader" in its emperor, because of a common hostility to the democracies. But if both succeeded in their schemes of conquest it would soon be clear that the world is not now big enough to hold more than one such empire.

To the east of Germany, occupying half the area of political Europe, is the populous and important part of the lands of the Soviet Union. This is the communist state, based on an economic system which is not supported by a majority in any other state. It is in political form a democratic federal republic; and there is no necessary theoretical incompatibility between its economic system and political and social

\* The failure of Italian fleets and armies reduced fascist Italy to the status of a German dependency by 1941. And the failure to prevent invasion of Italy led to the disappearance of the Duce, and the nominal abandonment of fascism, in July 1943.



democracy. But its economic faith makes it essentially hostile to the western democracies in so far as they are in fact plutocracies. In practice it has been ruled by a dictator, who is the leader of the single political party, by methods very similar to those employed in the avowedly dictator states.

The remaining independent states of Europe are in two groups, in the south-west and the south-east respectively. Spain and Portugal are now authoritarian states whose ruling parties hold a Roman Catholic-Fascistic ideology somewhat akin to that of Italy. In the south-east the Balkan states and Turkey had all adopted forms of representative government which are at least nominally democratic. Perhaps none of them has yet developed a sufficiently high general level of education and responsibility among their peoples to make democracy a reality. Also most of them have heterogeneous populations; and the presence of national minorities is a further difficulty for the working of democracy. Hence all of them are ruled by governments which are authoritarian in practice, even if democratic in theory and constitutional in form,\* because the need of unity in face of external dangers and internal divisions is the most obvious and pressing need of the state. Turkey has the advantages of a more homogeneous population, and of a social tradition which starts from the

\* Since this was written Romania, what is left of it, has become formally a totalitarian state and practically a dependency of Germany. Hungary and Bulgaria are in the same position of dependency; and Greece and JugoSlavia are now occupied by German and Bulgarian armies.

Muslim concept of the equality and brotherhood of all true believers; so that, in spite of the recency of its modernization, it appears to be in many respects the nearest to democracy, although its political life is confined to one party. Greece also has a homogeneous population and a democratic tradition.

It is to this anarchic Europe, of conflicting sovereign independent states and incompatible political ideologies, of uneasy majorities and rebellious minorities, of peace-loving peoples and aggressive tyrannies, that any proposals for a United States of Europe are to be applied. The dictators at least showed, by their loud proclamation of a "New Order" for Europe, that they realized its vital need for order. This was the strongest weapon in their armoury of propaganda. What of the democracies?

The only conceivable voluntary union of European states and peoples would be one based on the democracies. Before the collapse of France there were many suggestions that the close war-time alliance between Great Britain and France might logically lead to a more permanent association, or even to a union, of those two states. The latter in its simple form seemed even then unlikely, if only because Britain is already a member of the British Commonwealth as well as a European state. And a federation of only two, practically equal, members would be exposed to the maximum of internal friction. But if such a union did occur it could only reduce the number of the great powers by one. Its reactions on the other states of the British Commonwealth are quite incal-

culable. If Great Britain carried into such a limited union only its colonial empire, the resultant British-French colonial empire would be the greatest and most vulnerable of all such domains; while the combined populations of the two metropolitan countries would be about equal to that of Germany or Japan, and considerably less than that of either the United States or Russia. Such a development could hardly improve the prospects of world peace. Unless it formed a part of a far wider union it would be more likely to provoke alliances against it which would lead, after a brief truce for rearmament, to a third of the great wars. It is fortunate that, in June 1940, the French government refused union with the United Kingdom.

The many suggestions for unions among European states which were made before mid-1941 have ceased to be of more than local or regional interest. The German attack on the Soviet Union, and the Japanese attack on the British Empire and the United States, transformed a European war into a world war. China and Japan, America and the British Empire, are so clearly non-European or extra-European that no one can now dream that a merely European settlement could suffice to ensure peace—even to Europe.

After the war the Germans will still be the most numerous people, and potentially the strongest military power, in central Europe. The Soviet Union, in the east, and the United Kingdom, off the west, of mainland Europe are the only European states which have been able to resist German pressure. But

neither of them, standing alone, is so strong that an aggressive Germany would feel it hopeless to attack again, as she has already done twice in this century. And the third attack may be more directly aimed at a principal enemy in the first instance. Had Hitler possessed any of the political abilities of Bismarck he might have done that in 1938. Both in 1914 and in 1939 the German leaders made irretrievable political mistakes. It is not safe to count on a third repetition of the errors.

So long as both Britain and the Soviet Union remain well armed, and the alliance between them remains firm, it is likely to ensure each of them against attack. It may thus preserve peace in Europe for the next twenty years. But alliances are, at best, temporary expedients. This one is between two states whose peoples are of very different traditions and mental habits, because of the great differences in their geographical environments and so in their social development. In particular, Britain is pre-eminently a sea-power and Russia a land-power. Islanders and continentals find it difficult to understand each other's view-points. And though the newer developments of air-power may reduce this difference, it is not likely to remove it in our generation.

European governments, which inevitably thought of defence forces in terms of land armies, have always found it hard to appreciate the attitude of the British, who think of defence in terms of sea-power. The difficulty has been evident in every war since the sixteenth century in which Britain has had allies on the

mainland. And the influence of such a continental ally has always been exerted to press Britain to establish and maintain a great land army. During the war of 1914-18, for the first time, Britain did provide an army of continental magnitude. One result was that we came very near to defeat at sea, by the German U-boats, for lack of sufficient naval forces.

The maintenance of a strong navy is vital to all the British. And the resources of the forty-seven million people of the United Kingdom are not sufficient to provide and to man both a first-class navy and air force, and an army comparable with that of a continental great power. That fact must dominate British policy; even though it is at present ignored by some of those who urge that Britain must maintain a large conscript army after this war. When the time comes to decide on a long-term defence policy, Britain must again give first place to the forces which can maintain control of the seas. So there will be divergence of policy between Britain and her Mainland ally. And this divergence will give openings for the enemy to insinuate doubts between the allies in his efforts to divide them.

The European settlement will be very greatly influenced by the Soviet Union, particularly if the Red Army marches westward to Berlin and into the Balkan lands. Some of these lands may become Soviet republics. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union has no intention of annexing territories to the west of its 1940 boundary. But the Slav peoples of central and south-east Europe are

likely to look to Russia for that support against German pressure which they failed to obtain from the western powers after the rise of Hitler. For the first time the smaller peoples between the German lands and the Soviet Union will, rightly, regard their eastern neighbour as the stronger and more civilized. Such a change must have a great influence on their cultural, economic and political alignments.

Some pre-war suggestions for local ("regional") groupings of minor European states have been further discussed during the presence of some of their governments in London. The more prominent of these are proposals for a Czech-Polish confederation, a Balkan "entente," and some grouping of the Danubian states. These evidently overlap to some extent. They may be of considerable importance to the peoples directly concerned, and to their neighbours. But none of them can form a power which, on its own resources, could deter an aggressive Germany from her schemes of conquest. None of them has, or can have, an adequate geographical base for the development of such a power; since their lands do not possess sufficient natural resources. On the basis of the permanent geographical facts, rather than of shifting political alignments, there is here no probability of any lasting settlement.

The democratic states of Europe are in the north-west of the continent, chiefly round the North Sea. Is there here any possibility of a union which could form a stage towards a World Commonwealth? Here Britain is the obvious leader, and the strongest of the democratic states. Mr. Lionel Curtis has eloquently

advocated the formation of a real Union among the British Dominions for the one purpose of ensuring their security against war.\* Such union necessarily involves the establishment of a common government, responsible to the electors of the member-states, with full power to raise and control the necessary forces. If it is taken up by the British, would any of the European democracies join them? It is at least possible that some of them may be prepared to discuss it.

If such a union included the chief British Dominions and two or three of their present allies among the democratic states of north-west Europe, it could be strong enough to reduce the danger of aggressive war. It might convince a would-be aggressor that the chance of success in such a war would be too small to justify the gamble. If it could also demonstrate to the world that its members lose none of their individual or national liberties by union, then it may hope to attract other democratic peoples.

But no such democratic union can possibly be limited to Europe. Nor can any other wide union of peoples. For many groups of the European peoples have special relations to some extra-European lands and peoples, which in some cases may be more important to them than their relations to other parts of Europe—at least in cultural and peace-time affairs. Such are the connections of the British with the other states of the British Commonwealth and with the main body of the Englishry in North America. Of somewhat kin-

\* See his pamphlets *Decision*, 1941; *Action*, 1942; and *Faith and Works*, 1943; published by the Oxford University Press.

dred type are the cultural relations between the peoples of Latin Europe and those of Latin America, who share many features of a culture derived from a common inheritance. So also the Russians have an extension of their folk and rule eastward into Asia which reaches the northern fringes of the Far Eastern region, and gives them connections outside Europe. And several European peoples have connections reaching far to the south-east into the older homelands of their civilization in south-west Asia, which is in fact more a part of the "European" than of any other major human region. This includes the sacred places of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the three great religions of the West; and makes it very hard to define the limits of "Western" civilization towards India. Last, but not least in importance at the present day, the colonial dependencies of the Atlantic states of Europe give them very important economic and political connections with all Africa and with both the East and the West Indies.

Even the mention of these many direct extra-European connections of the peoples and states of Europe suffices to show that no practicable union of European peoples can be limited to that continent. "Europe," as a major world region, is so intimately related to many other parts of the world that it cannot be isolated without complete disaster to its present economic and cultural development. There is no hope, even for Europe itself, in a United States of Europe limited to Europe. Here isolationism is suicide.



## IV

### LANGUAGE

LANGUAGE is the chief means of communication among human beings. Without comprehension of a common language men cannot understand each other for more than the most elementary needs, or long work together. Those who share a common language are, by that fact, linked together and marked off from all other peoples. Plato defined the ideal limits of the size of a "city" as the number of people who could listen to a single orator. Now that number is the whole of those who understand his language and can "listen in" to the radio.

The people of one language share the body of folklore and literature of that language, and the traditions it enshrines. They are brought up on the same nursery-rhymes and folk-tales. Their ideals and ideas are moulded on the legends and scriptures of that tongue. They can sing the same songs, and to a large extent share the same jokes, and can have real discussions among themselves on any matters, and so get to know one another. From all this there is formed a wide common measure in their mental habits and background; so that they form a distinct people among the peoples of the earth.

Very little of this freedom of intercourse is possible between members of different language groups. Even among the educated classes only a very small propor-

tion in any nation are sufficiently at their ease in a foreign tongue to use it on equal terms with those for whom it is the mother tongue. For the overwhelming majority a difference of language is a complete bar to freedom of intercourse. These linguistic barriers are now the greatest obstacles to mutual comprehension and co-operation among the peoples of the world; and the insistence upon the revival or development of a distinctive and separate language, which is part of many nationalisms, has increased the number of such barriers within recent generations.\*

The expansion of the European peoples in the last few centuries has carried with it a wide spread of several European languages. Of these English has been carried farthest; and the peoples who speak it, here termed the Englishry, are now the most numerous of the European linguistic groups, while English is the most widely used of all languages.† It is, by any test, one of the leading languages of the world.

English is the language of at least nineteen-twentieths of the peoples of Great Britain, of North America north of Mexico, and of Australia and New Zealand. Within these lands there are several linguistic minorities, of which the largest is that of the Canadian-French, who number nearly four millions, mainly in province Quebec; the others include Welsh and Gaelic in

\* Éire offers an example of an attempt to re-establish an almost vanished linguistic barrier. The attempt has had little success in its first twenty years. (Cf. reports of an address by Mr. de Valera to the Gaelic League, in Dublin on Sept. 13, 1941.)

† Mandarin Chinese and the chief language of India, Hindi-Urdu, may perhaps be spoken by more people; but each of them is practically limited to one country.

Great Britain and many local groups in North America, and may total another three or four millions. Outside these lands, in which it is by far the dominant language, English is the language of the great majority of the peoples of Ireland and of a large proportion of the Whites of South Africa. The total number of those who claim English as their mother tongue is some two hundred millions—about a tenth of mankind; this tenth includes nearly all the citizen peoples of the British and American Commonwealths, so that English is the language of two of the great powers (see Fig. 10, p. 85).

Outside the areas in which it is the mother tongue English is widely taught and used as a "second" language. The nineteenth-century dominance of the two English-speaking powers on the high seas has made it the principal language of maritime intercourse and almost the *lingua franca* of the high seas. It is used to some extent in every important seaport; and it is rare to meet a ship on which there is no one able to speak English. Similarly it has become the chief medium of intercourse between the peoples of the populous lands of Monsoon Asia and the rest of the world. The spread of the American missionary schools in the Far East, the British educational services in India, and the combined economic and political influences of these two peoples, have made English the Western language which is most widely studied and used in the schools and colleges of India and the Orient and a common medium of intercourse among the educated sections of their peoples. The same is true of the negro peoples of large parts of Africa;

while in the south-eastern United States and the West Indies there are some fifteen millions of negro and coloured peoples who know no other language. It is also widely studied in Europe, particularly in those countries which have large maritime interests and overseas trade. Thus English, besides being the mother tongue of a tenth of mankind, is the chief second language of the educated classes of nearly half of mankind. Not the least important of these are those Indians who use English as a means of intercourse and thought and education in their sub-continent; though the number of Indians who have a good command of English is probably less than one-hundredth of the total population of India.

The Englishry, reinforced by the numbers in other language groups who read English freely, form the largest reading public of any one language on the earth. So it is worth while to put into English every book that is worth reading; and this vast reading public can have access to the whole range of human thought. Recent publishing developments, which have enormously cheapened new books and reprints, have at the same time demonstrated the existence of a large reading public to whom the more costly books were largely inaccessible; and so stimulated further production and wider circulation of serious works. The production of cheap books and pamphlets has been greatly stimulated; and it is now becoming one of the most important educational movements. It is likely to lessen the influence of the merely sensational journals and be a powerful factor in the education of the

people, and so a force which may help towards an understanding of the problems of the times. The wider spread of knowledge thus made possible is favourable to democratic aspirations. And the wider publication in English is also a stimulus making for the continual expansion of the numbers who read that language. The greater the range of intercourse and knowledge made accessible in English the greater is the incentive for the intelligent foreigner to learn the language.

All the Englishry are derived, either by direct descent or by linguistic absorption, from the peoples who spoke the language in the lowlands of Great Britain at the beginning of the modern age. The literary efflorescence of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which saw the early classics of the language established, preceded the colonization of North America. Thus the English Bible, Shakespeare, and Milton are as much the property of the overseas Englishry as of those who still dwell in the homelands. Hence all the Englishry have, embodied in their language, a common social heritage of literature and the ideals enshrined in it. This social heritage also includes a common background of law and of social and political structure in all their states, which derives equally from their common origin and a long period of joint development. Hence they share a common background of thought, ideals, and customs, continually reinforced by the use of a common literature in their homes, schools, and churches and by exchange among their press and public.

This common social heritage does not imply

identity of views or traditions. All the nations of the Englishry have been strongly influenced, in different ways and to different extents, by many other peoples and conditions. They have developed in different and varying environments; and their states and communities are in different stages of growth and development. England and Scotland have shared a thousand years of history, which includes many divergences between them, and for half of which they were separated by a bickering border warfare and bitter national hostility. Next in age come the older states of the American Commonwealth, where Virginia and New England have had a continuous development over the last three centuries, half of it as English colonies and half as members of the United States. Australia's history goes back half as far as New England's; while New Zealand has just passed the hundredth anniversary of its first settlement. The youngest members are the Prairie Provinces of Canada; while as united dominions both Australia and South Africa date only from the present century.

Thus in age the American Commonwealth is midway between the mother countries and the youngest of the British states. It is also compact, in strong contrast to the discontinuity which is the outstanding geographical character of the British lands. And though the latter cover more than twice as large a land area, so much of their land is in sub-arctic or tropical desert regions that the two commonwealths have approximately equal areas of good land in the temperate zones. In spite of this equality of effective

land area, the fact that the American Commonwealth is, as a whole, much more fully developed gives it a population much greater than that of the British; and it now includes about five-eighths of all the Englishry.

Three-fourths of the Englishry are now grouped in two main areas. Fifty millions are in the British Isles, and twice as many are in Eastern North America. The remaining quarter are widely scattered, with their largest groups on the Pacific slopes of North America and in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and a sprinkling over the rest of the British Empire.

The increasing majority of the Englishry in the American major human region are steadily making that region the principal area of development of the English language and its traditions; and so it exerts an increasing influence on all the rest of the Englishry. Most of the writers in English find that the majority of their readers are in North America and, consciously or subconsciously, are influenced by that fact. The cinema also tends to spread American forms of spoken English round the world.

The geographical position and the insularity of the British Isles enable them to be in constant and close touch with this American home of the Englishry, a contact which tends to draw their interests and sympathies away from Europe; for the latter, though so much nearer, is more "foreign." In normal times the peoples of Britain have probably more, and far more intimate, contacts with North America than with Europe. So that in many respects, geographical and political, social and economic, the British peoples are

poised between these two great regions of Western civilization and are not wholly European. Because of her insularity Britain has long stood a little aloof from Europe; and since the colonization of the new world her attention and interests have been more and more drawn across the ocean. It has been well said by a European thinker that "the new world begins at the Strait of Dover."

In respect to the linguistic barriers which sever mankind there have been two marked and opposing trends of change in Western Civilization during the last two or three centuries. On the one hand is the expansion of a few great languages, partly by the simple increase of the peoples using them, partly by the absorption of other peoples, and partly by their spread as second languages. This made French the language of diplomacy and the second language of polite society throughout Europe in the eighteenth century. The developments of research and teaching in Germany during the nineteenth century made it necessary for every scientific worker to have at least a reading knowledge of German. Since the industrial revolution English has become the most widespread of all languages. These three thus became the chief culture languages of Western Civilization; and at the close of the nineteenth century they were the only ones of primary importance. On the other hand is the growth of nationalist fervour among many peoples. This is, in many cases, linked with a fervid revival and development of their own language. It has brought Italian back into the front rank of languages, though in the



middle of last century it seemed destined to be submerged by French.\* It has revived some of the languages of the former Habsburg empire, against the recent political and cultural dominance of German in those lands. In the British Commonwealth it has led to the revival of Erse and the making of a new cultural and national language, Afrikaans, from the South African dialects of Dutch.

This strong revival of many national languages, and the close association in such cases between linguistic separateness and nationalist feeling, have introduced many and vigorous resistances to the absorption of small linguistic groups into the larger. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the English colonists in North America were easily able to absorb the small minorities of Dutch and Swedes, after the Swedish and Dutch colonies had been captured and incorporated; and later the United States also absorbed a flood of immigrants from several European lands. Now the rate of this absorption has diminished, and there is a strong tendency for the other-language immigrants to form cultural groups and associations which endeavour to maintain their linguistic and social identity and resist absorption, often with the aid of their compatriots in their homeland. This resistance to the merging of colonists into the country of their adoption is also very strong in some countries of South America. The governments of Italy, Japan,

\* The royal family of Italy is the House of Savoy, and French was its court language till the middle of the nineteenth century, and was widely used by educated Italians, among whom French books and journals had a large circulation.

and Germany have in recent years taken the lead in fostering cultural and political links designed to keep such colonists part of the nation from which they, or their fathers, came and to prevent their absorption into the people among whom they have settled.

These movements tend towards the formation of "plural" societies, such as those of India, with all the weaknesses inherent in the lack of cohesion between their communities. There is a risk of weakening that unity in essentials which is necessary to the working of democratic institutions. The change from a united to a plural society may well cause the break-up of a democratic republic, or its transformation to an authoritarian state.

It is clear from many examples that the existence of a nation does not depend on the possession of a unique language. The British and Americans are distinct nations who use one language. And most of the nations of Latin America use Spanish. The Swiss have four official languages, of which German and French are the most important in that they are the languages of seven-tenths and one-fifth of the nation respectively. Neither of these languages is limited to Switzerland. On the contrary, in both, as well as in its third language—Italian, spoken by a sixteenth of them—the Swiss citizens are only a small part of a large linguistic group. Yet the effective national unity of the Swiss is not doubted. These cases are, however, exceptional; and, at least in Europe, it is a common though not a universal assumption that a linguistic group is and ought to be a national group;

that all the German-speaking people should be members of a German nation-state; and that Flemings and Walloons should be separated politically because they use different languages. This assumption of the identity of linguistic and national-political divisions had a very considerable influence on the boundaries drawn at the Congress of Versailles in 1919, and after. It is not made quite so confidently to-day.

While the resistances to the absorption of the lesser linguistic groups into the greater have been multiplied and strengthened, other developments have multiplied the contacts between the different peoples and so increased the need for some common medium of intercourse. For some peoples, especially among the smaller language groups of Europe, the learning of foreign languages has become so necessary, and extended to so many, that an unreasonably high proportion of their educational effort is absorbed in learning to say the same thing in several different ways. The world needs an international auxiliary language, a common language of intercourse between foreigners, more now than it ever did in the past.

For a large part of Europe the spoken Latin of the Romans, the Low Latin, formed such a language during the heyday of the Roman empire; and after the fall of Rome the language remained. When intercommunication failed and the peoples were cut off from one another in the Dark Ages, the language broke into dialects, some of which have grown into the romance languages of to-day. But the vulgar Latin was maintained by the church as the common language

of educated men throughout Latin, or Western, Christendom during the Middle Ages; though after the thirteenth century its standing as the one literary language was weakened by the development of several vernacular languages and their literatures.

The break-up of Western Christendom at the renaissance and reformation put an end to that general use of Latin; and no other language has taken its place. The unquestioned dominance of France as the greatest of the European states from the close of the wars of religion till the early part of the nineteenth century made French the leading language of Europe during that period, and gave it a prestige as the language of diplomacy which is not yet entirely exhausted; but it did not suffice to make French as widespread as the Low Latin had been.

Each spread of a language has been associated with, and was primarily a result of, the expansion of the power and influence of the people who spoke that language. This has been generally true of linguistic expansions. The spread of Spanish and English in the new world was due to successful conquest and colonization. This fact, and the great strength of nationalist feeling in the world of to-day, make it very unlikely that any national language will be willingly accepted for international use. The "Allied and Associated Powers" who set up the League of Nations after the war of 1914-18 gave it two equal official languages, English and French; but it was only the temporary eclipse of Germany which enabled them to limit the number of official languages to two. Since then there have been great revivals of Russian and Italian, both

of which must now be counted among the major languages; and equal status in any world organization would now be claimed for at least six European languages—English, French, German, Italian, Russian, Spanish.\* If either of the German attempts to dominate Europe had succeeded, the question would now be settled; German would become the language of all educated Europeans and the principal world language. The imposition of one of the national languages as a world language could come about only as the result of such a conquest and the complete and lasting domination of the conquering people.

In C. K. Streit's plan for *Union Now* this language difficulty is evaded, or perhaps only postponed, by his limitation to fifteen selected states, among whose peoples only two of these major languages are spoken. Thus he can follow the League of Nations precedent and plan for a union with only two official languages, like the Dominion of Canada. It would be interesting, and a valuable comment on the scheme, to know how many Canadians are effectively bilingual. It is clear that to accept half a dozen languages for this purpose is to put general intercourse out of the reach of the mass of the peoples; and it seems that a world union, whether commonwealth or empire, must have one common language for general intercourse.

No language, past or present, has ever risen to the position of the dominant language for any group of peoples, or in a widespread culture, except through its status as the language of a dominant people. But it is

\* The order is alphabetic.

conceivable that an auxiliary language for intercourse between speakers of different mother tongues, may be established without such dominance; as the Low Latin of the Vulgate was established by the church during the Middle Ages in countries far beyond the limits of the Roman Empire, without being at that time the language of any one country. Such a language can only be an artificial one; for only an artificial language can be perfectly neutral among the many tongues of nations. There have been some hundreds of attempts to devise such a language; but only one of the languages so made has proved effective over a considerable period. That one is Esperanto, which has now been in existence for more than fifty years with a widening influence throughout.\*

Esperanto has been described as a simplified Low Latin. It is an artificial† and regular language. But its chief claims to adoption as a general auxiliary language rest on the facts that :—

1. It is neutral;
2. It is regular and systematic, and is therefore capable of precise and unambiguous statement;
3. Its origin and structure make it easier to learn than almost any national language, at least up to the stage at which the learner can make effective use of it;
4. Such a language is needed.

\* See the report to the League of Nations on *Esperanto as an International Auxiliary Language*, adopted by the Third Assembly, 1922.

† Artificially constructed; but made from existing root-words and grammatical rules.

As printed, nine-tenths of Esperanto is almost directly intelligible to an educated person who has given an hour or two to studying its grammar, and possesses a knowledge of a teutonic and a romance language, or of one of these plus a little Latin. The slowness of its spread is due to the fact that there is behind it none of the power which has spread the national languages, whose range is roughly proportional to that of the nations. Yet in fifty years it has developed so far as to demonstrate its real utility. It could, if widely taught, make it possible for the great majority of the peoples of different nations to have effective intercourse with each other and no longer be dependent on the few in each nation who have a good knowledge of one or more foreign languages. If the peoples of the world are to become united as free peoples some such language is needed, a language which can be taught in the primary schools and can be effective as a general means of intercourse and mutual understanding, without giving to those for whom it is a native tongue any advantage over the foreigner, as a national language does. It would be a second language for all and the mother tongue of none.

The wide use of Esperanto would make it possible for the masses, of the now literate populations, to get into touch with one another. No longer would intercourse between people of different language-groups depend on the few who have had time and opportunity to acquire a thorough knowledge of one or more foreign tongues—or on the far more numerous individuals who have a sufficient smattering of another language to enable them to misunderstand those who speak it.

## V

### THE STATES OF THE ENGLISHRY

SINCE the second quarter of 1940, which saw the conquests of Denmark and Norway, of the Netherlands and Belgium, followed by the capitulation of France and the submission of its Vichy government to the nazi dictator, the hopes of free men for the maintenance and renaissance of democratic freedom in our time rest on the Englishry.

These peoples are the great majority of the citizens in the British and American Commonwealths. Of their countries the two largest in area divide between them nine-tenths of the continent of North America; the others lie across the oceans from that continent, respectively 3000 miles eastward beyond the North Atlantic and 7000 miles south-westward across the Pacific; so that they are separated from the main mass of the Englishry by the width of the oceans, but not by any intervening lands or peoples \* (see Fig. 10, p. 85).

\* English is the language of half of that scattered third of the world which lies outside Mainland—more precisely of about four-ninths of the population and half of the area, including the Japanese and East India Islands as well as the British Isles. If we omit these island groups we find that English is the language of more than three-fifths of the population and half of the area of the new world in the western and southern hemispheres. On Mainland it is important as a first language only in the peninsula of South Africa; but as a second language it is widely known in many of the marginal regions. It is hardly known in the interior parts of that great land mass.



The six smallest of these countries are grouped in the British Commonwealth ; while the most populous stands apart as the American Commonwealth, with five-eighths of the joint population on less than a third of the joint area. The whole forms a group united by so many ties of tradition, sentiment, and common interests that no one of them can be indifferent to the fate of any other member of the group or of the democratic freedom of which they are the chief—almost the only—representatives in the world of to-day. In a very real sense they are a family of nations, given to criticizing and exhorting one another with all the freedom permitted, or assumed, within a family circle. Their criticism is made, and listened to, by a far larger proportion of the people in each of these countries than is possible between foreigners ; and it is guided by so intimate a knowledge that it is far more likely to “ get under the skin ” than is the criticism of strangers.

The external relations and long-period policies of any state are dependent on facts arising from (1) its geographical position, (2) its natural resources, their geographical distribution and stage of development, and (3) its “ ideology ”—i.e., the accepted mental habits and beliefs of its ruling people.

The geographical position determines who are its neighbours, and the distances which separate or fail to separate it from them, as well as the routes along which it has intercourse with other parts of the world. In some respects this influence is so obvious that all can realize it. Since the union of the crowns of England and Scotland early in the modern age, Great Britain


has been an insular state ; therefore sea-power has been its first line of defence and its principal weapon ; while it has had a freedom of internal development denied to most of its continental neighbours by the pressures across their land boundaries, and a less temptation to territorial expansion at their expense because of its oceanic outlook. Throughout the whole of the period since that union Britain has opposed any attempts by a great power to obtain control of the shores opposite the Thames estuary. The consistency of this policy through all the changing shifts of British and European politics is evidence of the permanent influence of such geographical relationships ; even though there have been brief periods in which the ruling class has subordinated these fundamental strategic interests to its prejudices, as between 1660 and 1688. For most states there are similarly permanent factors in their foreign relationships and policies.

The character and extent of its natural resources, and their distribution within its territory, are other permanent factors which affect the life and policies of a state. But it is also clear that their influence has varied from time to time. The fertile land which is the basis of its man-power, and the routes by which its resources may be collected and focused, have always been of primary importance ; but the coal of Great Britain was of negligible value before the seventeenth century, and the immediate basis of its industrial power in the nineteenth. The effective value and importance of such natural resources depend on the capacity to make use of them. Similarly the central

position of Britain in the land hemisphere, off the ocean gate of the great lowland in the principal focal area of world routes, was of no value before the modern age of oceanic navigation; but during this period it has been a prime factor in the rise of this small island state to the rank of a world power.

The third of the factors—that of the ruling ideology—is the one most liable to change; since a people can accept new principles, and even change their ways of thinking, more easily than they can alter the natural geography of their homeland. The geographical revolution of the age of discovery, which altered the world position of Britain, brought to it other revolutions, agricultural and industrial, social and political. It changed the ruling economic principles of the state from those of the medieval guild concepts of a fair wage and a just price, and the mercantilist economy of the early modern period to the nineteenth century's *laissez faire* ideology, which was not so much a policy as the negation of policy.

This policy of drift, or “non-interference,” allowed her adventurers round all the seas to gain for Britain, and to exploit for themselves and their backers, an empire which her governing class neither desired nor understood nor developed. It permitted the domination in her economic life of unrestricted private capitalism, guided only by the motive of immediate profits for the individual, which produced a one-sided economic development that left her dependent on imports for half the food essential to the existence of her people. And it allowed her to drift into the great war of 1914–18 almost nakedly unprepared, except for the navy,



English spoken by the majority  
 English spoken by a considerable minority

**FIG. 10.—THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENGLISH.**

(Reproduced by permission of the University of London Press Ltd. from their book, "A Political Geography of the British Empire," by Professor C. B. Fawcett.)

which she maintained because of a tradition rather than from any intelligent understanding of its vital importance. The abandonment of that negative policy has left us floundering in search of an acceptable politico-economic scheme of national life. It is fortunate that a fairly widespread realization of the immense complexity of the modern world has so far prevented the general acceptance of any one of the simple, and dubious, cures for complex ills applied elsewhere by either proletarian or fascist despots.

The American Commonwealth has had a development based on a similar ideology applied in a very different geographical environment. There also the mercantilism of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries gave way to a policy of *laissez faire* competition among individual profit-seekers, which both peoples like to call a sturdy, or rugged, individualism. But in America, from the colonial period till near the close of the nineteenth century, there was ample scope for all her adventurers in the westward thrust of her frontier towards the Pacific Ocean; and they were not able to involve their country in overseas imperialist expansion till the last decades of that century. Also her policy of *laissez faire* could not be applied to her foreign trade because import duties, inherited from the earlier policies, were at first the essential basis of the federal revenues; so, driven by the need for revenue and the competition of many interests for "protection," the United States surrounded itself by high tariff walls.

With the annexation of Hawaii, and the Spanish-American war, in 1898, the United States was launched

on a policy of overseas imperialist expansion, associated with the development of its "dollar imperialism" in Latin America. But in the last ten years there has been a remarkable reaction from imperialism towards a "good neighbour" policy, which is more readily reconciled with democratic principles; though it is not yet certain that this reaction will be a lasting one. And the Americans, like the British, seem to have no precise agreement on the guiding ideas of their national life, or perhaps even on whether such agreement is desirable. Both peoples share the ideals of democracy, on its political side at least, but neither seems to have any decided or agreed views on how far they need economic democracy, or on how a political democracy can be maintained in the crowded and warring world in which the mechanical and transport developments of recent generations have placed us.

The very large measure of personal and political liberty reached in all the states of the Englishry enables us to class them as democracies, in spite of their shortcomings and of the influence of plutocracy in much of their social and political life. They have developed fairly effective representative governments. These are parliamentary among the British and presidential in the United States; so that the former may fairly be called crowned republics and the latter an elective monarchy. If these peoples, who have so much in common, cannot achieve a working co-operation to uphold their common way of life against the tyrannies there can be little hope of effective action from any other peoples in our time.

The Americans and the British together number two-thirds of the democratic peoples, and their commonwealths are two of the five great powers of the world. By most measures of economic and political power they would be ranked as the first two powers; though neither has ever maintained in peace a land army equal to those of the other great powers, chiefly because they are both strategically insular states to whom sea-power is of the first importance for defence.

The relations between the British Empire and the United States of America are therefore quite primary in relation to any possibilities of joint action or of union among the democracies, as well as for their own peoples. These relations depend first on the geographical positions of their lands; and the first result of that position is that for each of them the other is the most important external power. Each of them has only one land frontier with another great power, and that is their common frontier across North America.\* This frontier is unfortified, under the control of a Joint Boundary Commission which has administered common affairs in the boundary zone for a century past without any serious friction.

But even apart from this common land boundary the two commonwealths find themselves close neighbours,

\* The only other land frontier of the British Commonwealth is the northern boundary of South Africa, and of the American that with Mexico. The dependencies of the American Empire have only one important land boundary, that of Alaska with Canada; and though those of the British Empire give it a great length of land boundary with dependencies of other empires and with minor states they do not anywhere make it a close neighbour to the homeland of another great power. At least not until China becomes a great power.

and their economic and strategic interests in the great ocean ways are intimately intermingled. The formation of a Canadian-United States Defence Board, and the leasing of naval bases in British colonial territory to the United States, have recently increased this intermingling of interests, and compelled all their peoples to recognize it. Each of them has a greater volume of trade with the other than with any foreign state; and the same is true of the bulk of their postal communications. They share a common language; and in many cultural relations they are merely sections of the Englishry.

With these facts in mind it is desirable to note some factors concerning the several nation-states of the Englishry. First let us take the largest of them, the American.

### THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH

The lands of the United States readily fall into political divisions like those of the British, though the relative extent of these divisions is very different in the two empires. On the one hand are the self-governing states, which are the members of the union, and on the other the dependent territories, such as Alaska and Hawaii, the Philippine Islands (till 1946?) and smaller islands in the West Indies and in the Pacific Ocean. There is also the area of the Panama Canal Zone. And many of the smaller republics of the Caribbean region are well within the sphere of influence of the United States; even though they retain all the forms of inde-



pendent states. Thus the politico-geographical structure is similar to that of the British and French Empires; and the whole may well be called the American Empire. In it the self-governing states are the division which is here called the American Commonwealth.

The American Commonwealth as thus defined occupies a compact and continuous land area of nearly three million square miles. This is the southern part of North America, between latitudes  $25^{\circ}$  and  $49^{\circ}$  north, and so mainly in the warm-temperate zone. The important area is the eastern half of this, which is the greater part of the fertile region of "Eastern North America," one of the four major human regions of the earth. This eastern half contains some four-fifths of the population, and an even larger proportion of the natural resources and of the industrial and social equipment of the commonwealth. The western half is, for the most part, an area of high arid or semi-arid plateaus and plains, with a very scanty population scattered in its oases and mining areas, and a few better watered and more populous lands near the Pacific coast.

The commonwealth is isolated from all its dependencies, except the subarctic territory of Alaska, by the sea. These latter dependencies are all situated between the tropics and inhabited by non-White peoples. They lie in two groups, the first in the Caribbean region, accessible by comparatively short voyages southward, and the other to west and south-west at much greater distances across the Pacific Ocean. The total area of these tropical dependencies is less than a

twentieth of that of the commonwealth, and their combined populations are less than a sixth \* as numerous as its citizen peoples; so that this American colonial empire is much smaller in relation to the metropolitan country than are those of most of the European colonial powers, chiefly perhaps because it is of more recent development, having been acquired only within the last fifty years. For these reasons its influence on the mental and political habits and thought of the citizen peoples of the commonwealth is as yet much less important and widespread. Not all American citizens are yet accustomed to think of themselves as an imperial people responsible for the rule of "backward" dependencies.

For any discussions of the possibilities of a World Commonwealth or of a World Empire the American Commonwealth is a primary fact. Its brief history of a hundred and sixty years as an independent state has been one of almost continuous expansion, for the first century from the Atlantic coast colonies westward to the Pacific, and subsequently oversea. This territorial growth has been associated with, and was mainly caused by, a parallel growth in population and wealth which has made it the greatest of the industrial powers. It is now the wealthiest and, next to the Soviet Union, the most populous of the great powers. Thus it is potentially the greatest military power of the world; for in the air, on the sea, and on land it can outbuild any

\* If the Philippine Islands become independent these figures will be reduced to approximately a hundredth and a fifteenth respectively.

other single power.\* Until 1931 its expansion had not been interrupted by any reverse or check serious enough to cast any lasting doubt on the average American's assumption of the complete rightness and self-sufficiency of America and her way of life. The great economic depression, which followed on the failure of the victors of the first world war to make any adequate reorganization of a shattered world economy, has shaken this complacency, at least for a time. The damage it has done came later, and has been far less, in America than in Europe, particularly in central Europe; but it has been sufficient to provide evidence that America is not in fact isolated, and that Americans are included in the assertion that we are all members one of another, spiritually and economically as well as biologically. The effects of the present war on the Americas gave further evidence of the same fact; even before the Japanese attack brought America in, and made this the second world war.

How far the citizens of America are convinced of these facts is as yet uncertain. All the traditions and enthusiasms of their history of continuous material expansion are opposed to them. It is little more than a quarter of a century since they first (in 1917) accepted any responsibility for civilization outside the Americas; † and the basic beliefs and mental habits which form a nation's ideology can hardly be changed in a single generation. Perhaps this essential unity of the

\* This is true at the time of writing. It would cease to be true if Europe became one state. It may also be modified by further industrial development of the U.S.S.R., or of China.

† Except for the annexation of the Philippine Islands in 1898.

civilized world is as yet realized by only a small minority in any country.

The geographical isolation which made possible the growth of "isolationism" in the United States is vanishing. The intensive development of air navigation which is now being feverishly pursued by all the industrial powers, not least in America, is likely to make such progress that twenty years hence the Atlantic may be no more of a barrier than the North Sea is now. Fifty years ago, before the airplane existed, a British Prime Minister could proclaim a (political) policy of "Splendid Isolation" from Europe, and rely on insularity and naval power to maintain it. Now no country has even as much effective isolation as Great Britain had then. Every development of our mechanized industrial civilization and of its transport reduces the possibility of self-sufficiency in any country or continent and increases the dependence of each one on all the others.

The civilization of America is part of Western Civilization. Like her population, it is derived from the older home of that civilization on the opposite eastern shore of the Midland Ocean. It is part of Christendom; and the bases of its ways of thought and literature are derived from the folkways of our ancestors in Britain and north-west Europe, and from the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin literatures which have given starting-points and direction to those of Europe. Western Civilization is now based on these two great regions. East of the Atlantic Europe stretches for three thousand miles from Ireland and Portugal to the

Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains. West of it North America stretches for a similar distance from the Maritime Provinces and Florida to the Pacific coast; though only the eastern half of North America is a fertile region comparable to Europe. In each the more important half is that nearer to the Atlantic. Between the two is the three-thousand-mile width of that Midland Ocean across which flows the greatest and densest and most continuous stream of traffic of any part of the oceans. Nowhere else are the strands of sea-borne traffic so closely interwoven or so actively used in linking together the peoples. But this linkage has so far been mainly cultural and commercial. Not until the third year of the world war of 1914-18 did the people of the United States take a share in the struggle "to make the world safe for democracy," to ensure peace and a forward-looking development among the peoples of the West. And then they drew out after a bare two years of effort. It took the thirteen colonies longer than that to establish their own union. Yet it is still important to all the democratic peoples that the world should be made safe for democracy.

The English colonies in North America were separate foundations independent of one another, as was inevitable in the circumstances and with the transport possibilities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And for a few years after the establishment of their independence it seemed probable that they would remain separate and that America would become, as Europe has remained, a medley of independent sovereign states which could settle their differences only by

war. Fortunately for America and the world, the local patriotisms and traditions of separatism among the thirteen states were relatively weak. They had all recently owned a common allegiance to one king; they shared a common language, a common law, and a common faith. They were then isolated from Europe by an ocean six-weeks wide; and no external power intervened to fan their dissensions. They occupied a continuous land area and were linked together by a vigorous coasting navigation on their common highway of the sea. They were at similar stages of cultural and economic development, and faced by common problems. They had just fought and won a long and difficult war as confederates. Most important of all, political thought in Western Civilization had by then, in some few individuals, passed beyond the narrowing concepts of local patriotisms; and the nascent republic found great and honest men to inspire its peoples and lead them to the higher political level on which the interests of the several states could be subordinated to the interests of their peoples, who therefore became "We, the people of the United States."

The first colonists had carried to America the principles and practice of the more democratic sections of the most democratic peoples of western Europe; and they and their descendants were able to develop them in comparative isolation and peace during the century preceding the War of Independence. So the United States of America was founded by the union of the most democratic states then existing; it has since been a leader in the application and development of

political democracy, and has long been a source of inspiration to all lovers of political freedom. For its people to take the lead in the movement to extend their principles by a still wider union with other peoples who share them would be in some sense a continuation of their own historic evolution. And, since the American Commonwealth is both the leading democratic state and the most powerful single state in the world of to-day, it is natural that other democratic peoples should look to America for a decisive lead.

During most of their independent history the Americans have been misled by that partial conception of geography which holds that the major division of the world is into eastern and western hemispheres, and a well-founded intention to keep out of European squabbles. The habit of speaking of the Americas as the Western Hemisphere may have produced the impression that they form half the world. Actually the two Americas together include little more than a quarter of the available land and less than an eighth of the human population of the world. In fact the Americas are about half, and the less populous half, of the area of Western Civilization, of which "Europe" is the original homeland and chief centre; and it is this great area of common civilization and traditions which is a primary human division of the world.

The lands round the North Atlantic form a much more closely knit group in human affairs than do the two Americas. But the accidents of history led to the formation of most of the American republics in the half-century from 1770 to 1820, by revolts from the British

and Spanish empires; and this similarity of origins, and of the resulting constitutional forms, has often obscured the greater differences of tradition and of law and practice among them. The more important subdivision of the Atlantic lands of Western Civilization is transverse to the ocean; it leaves the peoples of Roman law, Latin traditions, and Roman Catholic Christianity to the south, and those of the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon \* laws and traditions, and Protestant Christianity to the north, in the Americas and in western Europe alike. Thus real community of thought is easier across the Atlantic than between north and south on either side of it.

#### THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

The British Empire includes three groups of lands which are distinctive in their political relationships. The first, which is here termed the British Commonwealth, consists of the lands, mainly within the temperate zones, occupied by the self-governing states. The second group of lands lies mainly in the inter-tropical and sub-tropical zones and forms the colonial empire. In relation to this latitudinal grouping it is to be noted that Australia extends far into the tropics, though its inter-tropical lands are almost uninhabited and largely uninhabitable, and that the Union of South Africa is very largely sub-tropical, though over an important part of its area the effects of this latitudinal position are modified by an altitude which makes the High Veldt an area of warm-temperate climate. The

\* Anglo-Keltic would indicate the origins of these peoples and their traditions more correctly.



third great division of the empire is India. This lies between  $8^{\circ}$  and  $38^{\circ}$  north, and so is mostly tropical in its climates. Politically India is in transition between the status of a dependency and that of a self-governing dominion. In all respects India is of such importance that it merits separate treatment (see Ch. VII, pp. 121-9).

The states of the commonwealth are all governed as parliamentary democracies; and the chief formal link between them is that they are all constitutional monarchies in which one and the same king is the head of the state. This link is important because it is supplemented by the innumerable and imponderable ties of common traditions and habits, sentiments and loyalties, and by a large measure of common ideals and interests, which together have made the commonwealth a single power for the defence of its freedom and unity. The strength of this real unity has been demonstrated in the wars of this twentieth century.

How does this British Commonwealth stand in relation to any projects for the establishment of a wider World Commonwealth? Geographically it is so distributed that its two most populous states, Great Britain and Canada, situated in high latitudes on the opposite shores of the Midland Ocean, are respectively parts of the European and of the American major human regions. At the other side of the globe, antipodal to this ocean and so at the maximum distance from these Atlantic states of the commonwealth, are Australia and New Zealand. Since no two lands on

the globe are farther apart, in mere distance, than Great Britain and New Zealand, the fact that they can remain members of one commonwealth is evidence that no distance on the earth is now, in itself, sufficient to prevent effective unity of purpose and action; though distance is, and always will be, an important factor in human relations.

Great Britain contains the mother countries of the Englishry and is the citadel of the British Commonwealth and Empire. It is by far the most populous of the British states, with more than half of their total White population. It has an even greater proportion of the industrial power, so that it is the chief base of both the man-power and the munition supplies of the commonwealth.

The island lies in the northern part of the north temperate zone, between latitudes  $50^{\circ}$  and  $60^{\circ}$  north. It is only in, and off, the north-eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean that any considerable densely peopled areas lie in such high latitudes; and Britain is one of the most northerly of populous lands. To the north and north-west of it are the polar wastes. Only to the east and south-east, and across the ocean to the south of west, does it look towards populous lands. At its south-eastern corner Britain approaches within twenty miles of Mainland; its south-western point is about a hundred miles north of the western tip of France; and the north-east of Scotland is some three hundred miles west of southern Norway. Thus the island blankets the westward lowland coast of Mainland; its south-east half is part of the chief focal area

of world routes, and Dover Strait is the most important defile on the high seas.

England is the south-eastern half of the island, with Scotland to the north and Wales to the west. This half contains by far the greater part of the fertile lowlands, and of the mineral wealth; while it has also the best climate and, in its approach to Mainland, the best situation in respect to the external peace-time relations of the island. Hence it is natural that England contains the majority of the population—actually more than three-fourths—and that for many of the peoples of Mainland it overshadows the other countries. Many foreigners use “England” as synonymous with “Britain.” It is significant of a different position and greater knowledge that this mistake is not so common in the other dominions or in America.

England has long been an area attracting immigrants from surrounding lands; and a considerable, though unknown, proportion of its population is of Scottish, Welsh and Irish origin. This immigration is still active. It is similar to the immigrations into England from the nearby countries of Mainland at various periods, which have gone to make the English people a mixture of most of the racial types of Europe.

Great Britain is the homeland of the Englishry and of the British; but it is also a European country, insulated but not isolated from Mainland by the Narrow Seas. It is too near to Europe ever to remain untouched by the currents which move the European peoples, or to ignore European conflicts and dangers.

The Strait of Dover is a sea channel which can be commanded by sea-power; but it is only twenty miles wide, a distance which is negligible to aircraft and well within the range of great guns. So, like the other nations of the Englishry, the peoples of Great Britain are influenced by many factors. They are English, or Scottish, or Welsh. They are both British and European. They meet difficulties and doubts arising from clashes of interest and influences from these several quarters, which it is not always easy to resolve, but some of which might find a solution by merging into an even wider commonwealth.

The Dominion of Canada occupies the northern half of North America, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans; and in area it is the second largest continuous territory of a single state in the world. Its area is less than half of that of the Soviet Union, and a fourth larger than that of Australia or of the American Commonwealth. But half of this vast extent is in the cold deserts, and most of the rest is on the poor land of the Canadian Shield or the western mountains; so that the area of the land capable of agricultural development is probably not more than a sixth of the whole,\* and even that is near the northern limits of agriculture. Thus, in spite of its great extent, Canada is relatively a small country, consisting of several areas of cultivable and habitable land in the southern fringes of a vast wilderness. These areas are, in order from east to west :—

\* Yet a sixth of Canada equals six times the area of Great Britain.

1. The lowlands of the Maritime Provinces, south of the Gulf of St. Lawrence ;
2. The St. Lawrence lowland, along the estuary and the great river, inland to the rapids above Montreal where the river cuts across the southward extension of the barren rocks of the Shield ;
3. The peninsular lowland of Ontario, bounded by three of the Great Lakes ;
4. The triangle of settled land in the Prairie Provinces, whose apexes are marked by the Peace River district and the cities of Winnipeg and Calgary ;
5. Some of the valleys in the south and southwest of British Columbia.

These inhabited areas are distinct from each other, and the three to the east are widely separated from the prairies by the thousand miles of wilderness between the Ontario peninsula and the Red River basin of Manitoba ; while the Far West is also cut off by the Rocky Mountains. All five are strung along the lines of the transcontinental railways which link them with one another and with the oceans.

The St. Lawrence lowland is a well-marked area bounded on the south by highlands which cut it off from New England. It is the inhabited land of Province Quebec, which is French Canada ; and the geographical separateness of this region has contributed very largely to the preservation of the French Canadians as a distinct people. It has isolated them from the open lands of easy movement and inter-mixing, in which the other immigrant peoples of

North America have been brought together, and so aided the maintenance of their characteristic ways of life.

The other four relatively populous areas form English Canada. Each of them is, however, the northern part of a natural region which is mostly in the United States to the south. Their differentiation and separateness from that country is due to the political boundary and the result of living under somewhat different laws and traditions.

Canada is the oldest of the overseas British Dominions, dating from 1867, when the divisions between its peoples were overcome by a federal union. It is, in its traditions and customs, British and French (pre-Revolution) and American. It is in and of the new world; but it has never broken the links of loyalty and sentiment which unite its peoples to the mother countries east of the Atlantic. In population and resources the dominion is the second state of the British Commonwealth; and it has taken a leading part in the modern political developments which have built up that commonwealth. It is also, because of its geographical position, in closer contact with the American Commonwealth than is any other British state, and within the area which that commonwealth has, by its Monroe Doctrine, pledged itself to defend. Canada has thus a double guarantee against external conquest or invasion; and a war in Europe is no more a direct threat to Canada than it is to any other state of the Americas. Canada is in this war, as in the last great war, because of loyalty to principles and compatriots

and not because of any immediate threat to her own material interests.

At the other side of the globe, islanded near the centre of the water hemisphere, lie Australia and New Zealand, separated by a thousand miles of stormy sea ; but so much nearer to each other than either of them is to any other country that it is impossible not to think of them together.

Australia has a land area which is slightly greater than that of the American Commonwealth ; but a large part of it is occupied by tropical deserts. Most of its northern and western areas are poor land on low plateaus whose summits are not high enough to feed perennial rivers. It is only in the south-east and south-west corners that there are considerable areas of good land in the temperate zone, with more in the tropical coastlands of the north-east. But the total extent of such land, and its proportion to the whole, is similar to that of Canada. New Zealand, somewhat farther south, is more like Great Britain in both area and proportion of good land, and in climate. The populations are mainly derived from the British Isles, and the proportion of settlers from other lands is very small. Both countries have remarkably homogeneous populations for lands of recent settlement.

For both New Zealand and Australia their remoteness from the populous lands of Western Civilization is the dominant fact in their external relations, and in much of their internal life. In both, the populations, and particularly the towns, are on or near to the

coasts. The insularity of both countries combines with this coastal position of most of their cities and populous areas to make them particularly conscious of, and dependent on, sea communications and sea-power. The British navies are their first line of defence; and since the seas are all one, that defence may be made in distant waters. But to the north of them, less than half as far away as Great Britain, is Japan; and it is certain that many wondered whether the United States navy would form another line of defence if the need arose.\* The problems of the Pacific offer a meeting-ground for the Englishry of these dominions and of North America, in which they have many common interests and may meet common dangers.

Almost midway between the North Atlantic and the South Pacific states of the commonwealth, on the open-sea route between them, lies the Union of South Africa. This differs vitally from the other dominions in two important respects. First, the two million Whites, who are its free peoples and form the self-governing state, are not the majority of its inhabitants. These Whites are a racial oligarchy ruling in imperial fashion with absolute power over the seven or eight millions of non-White peoples who are the labouring classes and the mass of the population. Here the democratic character of the state is profoundly modified by the fact that its democracy is limited to one section of its peoples. In relation to the non-Whites it is an authoritarian state.

\* The question was answered in the affirmative by Japan, on Dec. 7, 1941.



In the old Cape Colony, before the formation of the Union, the franchise was open to those non-Whites who could satisfy the prescribed conditions ; and in the latter decades of the nineteenth century the political policy in that colony was that of "equal rights for all civilized men," which is the only really democratic policy possible in a land whose inhabitants include peoples at widely differing cultural levels. The Union has abandoned that policy for one of racial discrimination ; and South Africa is now a land of friction and accumulating tensions between the races. Its internal life tends to be more and more dominated by the colour question in its innumerable ramifications. Politically and socially South Africa is a land of violent contrasts between the real political democracy within its citizen peoples and the negation of all democracy in the relations between them and their subject peoples. As such it is one of the sore places in world relations between the White and the non-White peoples.

The second distinguishing character of the South African Union is the lingering hostility between important sections of its citizens which derives from the century of friction and wars between the British and the Dutch. The Cape was originally a Dutch colony ; and it was taken by the British during the Napoleonic wars, while the Netherlands was part of Napoleon's transitory empire in Europe. From then till the establishment of the Union in 1910 there was latent or active hostility ; and not until the memories of that century are allowed to fade can the white peoples of South Africa become one united nation.

The last of the states which may be counted in the British Commonwealth is Éire, though its claim to that status is doubtful. Like South Africa, but in more exaggerated form, Éire is a victim of memories of centuries of conquest and enmity; and it has had an even shorter period of self-government—since 1922. Here there is no racial complication, but there is that of religious animosities. Éire is a Roman Catholic country, and that church is probably the strongest force in the state, particularly in regard to its education and press and much of the social life of the people. Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom. It is, mainly in reaction, violently protestant; and the antagonism between the two still bears many of the characters of the wars of religion. In the present war Éire is neutral, though her freedom is at stake equally with that of Great Britain, and the defeat of the latter would leave her exposed to conquest from Europe just as much as it would leave other small states in west Europe without any hope of effective resistance to German aggression.

Each of the states of the British Commonwealth is in theory and in law an independent sovereign state of equal status. In practice their independence is qualified by the virtual alliance in which they are held together by imponderable bonds, whose strength depends mainly on internal forces in each state and on their sense of unity in their commonwealth. There is, as yet, no single government with authority to control all their forces and represent them as a single unit in their external affairs. These six, and India, were separate inde-

pendent members of the League of Nations, in whose Council and Assembly they did not necessarily vote or act together.

What would be the relation of this British Commonwealth to a European union? If all its states were members the union would not be solely European; it would be well advanced towards becoming a World Union. But most suggestions for a United States of Europe assume that Great Britain is to be a member of that union; and they leave the position of the other dominions vague. Yet if the United Kingdom entered such a European union alone that act would involve her secession from the British Commonwealth. For such a union can come into being only by definite and formal agreement among its foundation members; and each dominion would have to decide for itself whether it would come in or stay out.

It has been suggested that no such decision need be made; and that the present links between Great Britain and the other dominions need not be affected by the change of status which would result from Great Britain's becoming a member-state of a United States of Europe. But suppose such a position did arise, and that, after it, an external power (e.g., Japan) attacked Australia. As a member of the British Commonwealth, Great Britain would at once go to the help of Australia with all her forces. But as a member of the United States of Europe she would have lost both the right and the power to take such action on her own initiative. And would the United States of Europe be bound to go to the help of a state which was neither a member

nor a dependency of that union? Clearly not. Hence the entry of Great Britain into a union limited to Europe would in fact be at the same time a secession from the British Commonwealth.

In their relations to any wider union or commonwealth the British states must either act together or break up their own union. But this union among them has grown up with their development; the younger dominions have been in it from the day when they first became responsible self-governing states; it has stood the test of time and of war, including two world wars. Is any responsible person going to suggest seriously to them that they should risk or throw away such a well-tried and valued union with their kin for the sake of a new and untried union with foreigners? It is not practical politics to propose that Great Britain should become a member of any merely European union, or of any union which does not also include the other dominions. Together the peoples of the British Commonwealth may move towards closer co-operation with other free peoples. But any scheme for a World Commonwealth which begins by breaking up that of the British is foredoomed to failure.

## VI

### DEPENDENCIES

THE dependencies, or colonies, held by a few of the Western powers are mainly in the Hot Belt. In the half of the earth's surface between 30° N. and 30° S. latitude they occupy more than half of the land and contain four-fifths of the population. Omitting polar territories, the dependencies include about a fourth of the lands and peoples of the world. This quarter is of great importance in relation to all the geographical, political, military, economic and social aspects of a World Commonwealth, or any wide union of Western peoples.

The chief colonial powers are Britain, France, Italy, and the United States of America among the greater powers, and the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain among the lesser powers,\* with small holdings by Australia and New Zealand. The metropolitan countries of seven of these eight colonial powers are in west and south-west Europe; and the colonies of six of these together include about ninety-seven per cent of the area and ninety per cent of the population of all colonial dependencies.† Thus the problem is at present the direct responsibility of a small number of states, though it is, of course, one which concerns all peoples.

\* This is a statement of the position as it was in 1939. In each of the groups the order is approximately that of the extent of the colonial empires.

† i.e., while the Philippine Islands are an American colony. If these become independent these proportions would rise to over ninety-eight per cent.




FIG. II.—THE ZONE OF DEPENDENCIES.

There are extensive, but almost uninhabited and therefore unimportant, dependent territories in the Polar regions. But practically all the important dependencies are situated in the Hot Belt of the earth, roughly within thirty degrees of the equator, and by far the greater part is between the tropics (see Fig. 11, p. 111). These are the ones to be considered. They include most of Africa, a large part of southern Asia, and islands in all the oceans in these latitudes. Central and most of South America, together with the islands of Cuba and Haiti, is the only large inter-tropical land area not included in these dependencies. It is the region from which the European colonial expansion of the nineteenth century was excluded by the forces behind the Monroe Doctrine. But this area does not include the metropolitan region of any important state except Brasil, which has its chief centres of population near to the southern tropic.

This very distinctive distribution of the dependencies suggests that their status may be in some way associated with their geographical position. Is the relative "backwardness" of their peoples due to the influences of climate? There is a very widespread belief that the climates of the Hot Belt are enervating, and that the peoples of the temperate zones, and especially of the cool-temperate zones, are more energetic, vigorous, and persistent than those of hotter lands. The existence of some such differences between the peoples during recent centuries is not doubted; but it is not yet fully proved that climatic differences are responsible for them. The "backwardness" of the inter-tropical

peoples is also associated with extreme poverty and the prevalence among them of very low standards of living, of widespread malnutrition, and of many endemic and parasitic diseases. There is no conclusive evidence that a negro or other coloured population could not reach the standards of Europeans if they were given equal advantages in nutrition and education over two or three generations. But the climatic differences between their homelands are permanent facts; and if the present backwardness of the inter-tropical peoples is directly due to climatic influences there can be little hope for them. Yet civilization began near the northern tropic, and local flowerings of higher cultures have since occurred at several places within the tropics, in South India, IndoChina, and some of the East India Islands, as well as in Central America, and endured for centuries; so that it is not yet necessary to accept the hypothesis of permanent inferiority due to climate, however flattering it may be to the peoples of the temperate zones.

Is the backwardness due to some inherent racial qualities? The race which is most distinctive of the dependent lands is the Negro. Negroid elements are numerous in the populations of South India, and among some of the peoples of the East Indies. Negroes are the great majority of the inhabitants of Africa; and, as a result of the slave trade, they contributed a very large share to the peopling of the eastern lands of the Americas between latitudes  $40^{\circ}$  N. and  $30^{\circ}$  S. There the proportion of Negroes, and of negro blood in the mixed populations, is usually high, though it varies very considerably in different countries.



If the Negro is inherently inferior, all these peoples may be expected to rank low in the scale of human ability, when it becomes possible to rank them objectively and without prejudice. But there have been many instances of individual Negroes of high capacity in various forms of human effort, both in Africa and in the Americas; and these are sufficient to show that the charge of inherent general inferiority is at least not proven. It cannot be proved, or disproved, until Negroes and other human beings have lived and worked under equally favourable conditions for some generations. If it exists, it will then become manifest by the presence of a larger proportion of inferior individuals among the inferior race. In every people there are wide differences in the mental, moral, and physical qualities of the individuals; and, as mankind is primarily made up of individuals, not of races or nations, the value of each should depend solely on his personal qualities and not on his race or colour. The only wise and safe course for a World Commonwealth is to repudiate all racial prejudice and divisions, and provide full opportunities to all its peoples.

It has become common to speak of these "dependent" peoples as "wards of civilization"; and that view of their relations to the ruling states has become explicit in the case of those held in mandated territories under a slight supervision of reports to the Mandates Committee of the League of Nations. The influence of this concept has affected all the colonial powers to some degree in their relations to these dependencies.

It suggests an analogy between their inhabitants and the children of the metropolitan country.

Implicit in the view that these peoples of the dependencies are "wards" is the expectation that they will at some time grow up and become responsible adult peoples. In the case of children the attainment of adult status is determined by a factor outside the control of either the children or their guardians; it is simply the fact of reaching a legally defined age—usually twenty-one years. Many children regard themselves as "grown up" and fit for independence some time before reaching that age; and, conversely, many guardians are apt to think that their wards are not able to stand alone for an even longer period. Nevertheless no socially serious disputes can arise from these differences of personal opinions.

But so far it has proved impossible to define any agreed stage in the political development of these dependent peoples comparable to the legal coming-of-age of an individual. It is part of the duty of a guardian so to school and educate his wards that they may in due time be fit for the responsibilities of adult life. In practice such schooling can be given only to individuals; and as yet it is given to only a small proportion of the children in these colonial territories, in several of which there is now a small number of partly educated adults. It should be practicable, and it would be wise, to admit to commonwealth citizenship all individuals in these peoples who can satisfy the requirements, even though they may not be citizens of any constituent state of the commonwealth. This has

been done, under different circumstances, in "territories" of the United States of America and in "colonies" of the French Empire. But it is most urgent to press forward the provision of education for all these peoples. The further question of the transfer of such territories from the status of dependency to that of member-state is more difficult. Fortunately it is not immediately urgent. At present the great mass of Negro Africa is politically almost inert.

A further question is whether the control of such dependencies in a wider union should be left to the individual states which now govern them, or be transferred to a central government. It seems clear that the ultimate responsibility must be in the hands of some wider authority than that of any single state. There is no obvious reason why the local parliaments of France, or England, or Scotland, or the Netherlands, should control the government of such "colonies"; but there are very sound reasons for using the experienced colonial administrators of these and other "colonial powers" to carry on their work and become the senior members of a colonial service to be recruited from all the citizens of the commonwealth. Such a service would face difficult questions arising from differences of languages, laws, and customs, and of administrative procedure; but these problems differ only in degree, and not in kind, from those of the existing colonial empires. Unless they are multiplied and exacerbated by attempts to impose a needlessly rigid uniformity, they need give rise to no difficulties greater than those which have already been surmounted.

The exploitation of the subject peoples of the dependencies by those of the metropolitan countries is a process which has passed through several stages and is still evolving. These changes have been roughly parallel in the chief colonial empires.

The modern colonial period began with the first European expansions in the sixteenth century; and in its early stages the conquerors, themselves dominated by the mercantilist concepts of political economy and strongly influenced by the traditions of the dying feudal age, regarded their colonies as estates to be used solely in the immediate interests of the owners. This stage saw the extermination of some of the weaker of the conquered peoples, such as the Arawaks of the West Indies, and the establishment of the slave trade to bring negro slaves from Africa to work the plantations of the Americas. It was a period of crude and ruthless exploitation checked by no belief in, or respect for, any human rights of a conquered people; and its practices were an inevitable result of the belief that the conqueror acquires absolute rights over the conquered.\*

This period of the crudest exploitations came gradually to an end because of the slow moral advance among the ruling peoples, and the relative weakness of an economic system based on slave labour in competition with that developed among the freer peoples; since slave work is inevitably less intelligent and adaptable than that of free men. The chief steps in the change are marked by the abolition of the slave

\* The same belief is producing similar results to-day in the lands conquered by the Germans and Japanese.

trade and of slavery, and the crusades for their suppression, which is not yet complete. These have developed in all the Western countries roughly *pari passu* with the advance of democratic concepts which have changed the attitudes of their peoples and governments. Exploitation has by no means ceased; but it is less crude, and it is continually checked by the growth of a sense of responsibility as trustees. It would be a mistake to think of the changes as a steady improvement. There was a marked reaction in the later decades of the nineteenth century, with the scramble for Africa and the collection of the suddenly valuable rubber of the Amazon and Congo forests and the gold of South Africa. In every one of the metropolitan countries there are still powerful interests pressing for more active and direct exploitation of "lower" classes and "inferior" peoples. And there is to-day a revival of the beliefs in racial superiority and in the unlimited rights of a conqueror which provided theoretical justification for the worst excesses of slavery in the past.

There has also been an important military exploitation of colonial peoples. This is as old as imperialism; and it is, in some degree, inseparable from imperialism. The armies of India have often been used to serve the interests of the British Empire. France counted on colonial soldiers for aid in the defence of the metropolitan country. And Germany fought her African wars in 1914-18 almost entirely with African troops. So long as the colonial powers may have to fight for their possessions, or for their own security, they will be

as ready to use colonial troops as to use their own citizens for war. No independent state can isolate any of its peoples wholly from the danger of war. The colonial peoples will be exempt from war only when the whole world is exempt. In this matter they are not to be distinguished from other peoples.

A marked trend towards the amelioration of the crude exploitation of colonies is that towards some measure of local autonomy in their governments. Even where this is only sufficient to allow of the public expression and discussion of grievances it is a check on the worst abuses of authority. Without an adequate education of the people it is possible that the establishment of full local autonomy might be merely a cover for the transfer of effective power from external to internal exploiters, rather than a real improvement in the condition of the mass of the people concerned. A mere change of masters is not freedom; and a slave needs more than the removal of his chains to make him a free man. The essential duty of those ruling peoples who are honest trustees of colonial territories, in the interests of all mankind, is the education of their wards. Of this education local autonomy is a part. But the most urgent work must be directed towards the removal of the linked evils of poverty, malnutrition, and ignorance.

British imperialism has been in irregular retreat from the cruder forms of exploitation ever since the loss of the American colonies. The chief stages in this "de-imperialization" of the dependencies have been marked by the abolition of the slave trade, and later of slavery, within the empire. This was followed by the

crusade against the slave trade and slavery, and its associated philanthropic movements on behalf of subject peoples, which were partly inspired by missionary fervours. On the political side the same developments gave first local autonomy and then complete independence to the dominions, and have already gone far towards local autonomy in many of the crown colonies and in the provinces of India. It has also given India tariff autonomy, in spite of Lancashire's demand for free imports. It is possible that many of the politicians who speak of the British Empire as a "Commonwealth of Nations" have not considered the full implications of that description. But, in so far as they mean what they say, their use of this term is a complete repudiation of imperialistic exploitation of any one of those "nations" by any other.

## VII

### NON-WHITE PEOPLES

INDIA is by far the greatest of all the dependencies which have ever been held by an external colonial power. It fell to the British during the European expansion and the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, chiefly because British sea-power was able to hold off the rival colonial powers. The conquest was carried out mainly by the use of Indian troops; and at no stage did the peoples of India offer any united resistance. In fact, for many of them the British were hardly more foreign than the previous rulers; so that the change was from one foreign ruler to another, and at the time it was in many cases beneficial to the masses of the peasantry in some of the more populous areas. It replaced the anarchy of a crumbling empire by an orderly, if despotic, rule among peoples accustomed to despotism. And in the eighteenth century India was no more a united country than Europe. Such nationalist feeling as now exists is mainly the product of the last hundred years; and it is in large part due to British rule and the impact of modern Western Civilization.

India is one of the four populous major human regions of the world, and as such one of the important lands in any consideration of world organization. It is in area and in natural resources the smallest of the four; but it is the most densely peopled, and probably



the poorest (see p. 23). Further, and more permanently important, while the other three are all in the north temperate zone, India lies astride the northern tropic and is for the most part tropical and subtropical in climate; so that no part of its lowlands experiences a cold season. This last fact makes for greater differences in the conditions of human life and work between India and the other three comparably populous regions than between any two of those. India is also the most important area of the non-White dependent peoples in which there is a strong movement for democratic self-government; though this is a minority movement, since even to-day the great majority of the peoples of India are too completely absorbed in the struggle for a bare subsistence to be able to give much thought to any social or political relations other than those of their small local group. It is clear that the British raj cannot continue indefinitely; but India does not yet seem able to replace it from within by any equally effective uniting power.

India has in some respects a greater measure of political unity than any one of the other comparable regions, since practically the whole of it is within the British Empire and, except for Ceylon, forms the Indian Empire. This imperial unity overrides a complex of provinces and native states which forms as tangled a group of political units and subdivisions as that of central Europe in the later centuries of the Holy Roman Empire. It also covers a number of language groups which are fairly comparable in their distribution to those in the mixed lands of central Europe and the

Balkans; and among which it is equally impossible to draw any satisfactory boundaries. There are important linguistic minorities in most of the provinces. In its internal political and linguistic distributions India is possibly even more complex than Europe.

Over this tangle of states and peoples the British Empire has spread a single suzerainty, and a considerable measure of administrative and economic unity. With only a few partial exceptions among the native states, India is a free-trade area with a single currency, and movement within the empire is not obstructed by frontier barriers and passport difficulties. There are still differences in the legal and social systems prevailing among its different peoples, though Hindu culture and life have had very great influence on all of them. Yet the internal divisions, due to differences of religion and caste, of language and loyalties, are as prominent and as deeply rooted as are the nationalist and linguistic divisions among the peoples of Europe; they make it impossible to conceive a democratic India united on any basis except that of federation; and they offer great obstacles to even that much unity.

Since the province of Burma, with its distinct linguistic and religious systems, was separated from India, the greatest division is that between Hindu and Muslim; and this has led to a movement for the division of India into two self-governing states or dominions, of Pakistan and Hindustan, corresponding to the lands dominated by Muslim and Hindu majorities respectively. Each of these contains very considerable religious minorities, and there is no clear boundary

between them. South India is often regarded as partly distinct from the centre and north because of linguistic differences; but here also there is no clear boundary, though there is a frontier zone of poorer and more thinly peopled country across the peninsula north of Mysore and central Madras. But for the unifying effects of the British raj it is probable that many of these different linguistic and religious groups might develop separate, and hostile, nationalisms. There are already suggestions of such tendencies, which have led to the formation of the provinces of Orissa and Sind in recent years (1936); and it is chiefly their common hostility to British imperialism which unites the politically conscious Indians of the different nations. These internal problems of India are, however, mainly matters for Indians. The importance of India to present-day proposals for a World Commonwealth rests on other considerations.

In most discussions of "Federal Union" or "European Union" all the countries suggested as possible or probable members of such a federation are inhabited by white men; and if such a federation is limited to them it would start as a white man's union, with large dependent territories inhabited by non-white peoples. It would also be limited to peoples and states of Christendom and the Christian traditions. In that case it would be in danger, and would certainly be accused, of perpetuating the colour divisions and prejudices now associated with the rule of Whites over non-Whites. Thus it would antagonize the majority of mankind, for the Whites are at most a bare third;

and it would abandon the hope of extending democracy over all the world. If we are to attain a world unity of free men the leading peoples must from the first show that such unity can override religious and racial divisions as well as those of nationalism and language. From this point of view the attitude towards the non-Whites, in India and China and many smaller countries, is vital to the future.

The reasons which have influenced many supporters of "Federal Union" to omit India from their schemes are probably of two groups. First: India is not as yet a self-governing or wholly democratic country. In fact the caste system of the Hindus, which has strongly influenced all the social life of other Indians also, is in its more rigid social aspects, particularly in its treatment of the "untouchables," entirely incompatible with a democratic society. Muslim social tradition, except in so far as it has been modified by the pervasive influence of caste, is democratic; though Muslim political tradition is that of autocratic monarchy. The concepts of Western democracy have been introduced to India by the British and their educational system, and have been spread widely during the last generation by their partial application in the government of the great provinces. And the oft-repeated pledge that "dominion status"—i.e., full self-government and partnership in the British Commonwealth—is the goal of these political developments has given all politically conscious Indians additional reasons for claiming equal status with the white citizens of the commonwealth. Both "honour" and political wis-

dom would urge the British to implement that pledge at the earliest possible date.

India is a land of old and well-established civilization; but it is still mainly in the stage at which the great majority of its peoples are illiterate peasants. The chief lands of Western Civilization have passed that stage very recently; since it is only within the last two hundred years that formal schooling has become widespread in even the most advanced countries, and in few has it been general for more than three or four generations. It is not till the second or third generation that general schooling can produce a literate people, capable of becoming educated. Unless the schooling process is speeded up—as the Soviet Union has done it—a free and democratic India is still remote. The difficulties of working a democratic system of government under such conditions have been exemplified in many lands—one need only mention Latin America. The older democracies extended their franchise only by stages to the present position of almost universal adult suffrage, in general roughly *pari passu* with the development and extension of their schooling systems. It would seem reasonable to apply similar stages to the less advanced peoples by limiting the franchise by the requirement of some educational qualification for citizenship such as, at least, the ability to read and write. It is risky to extend the privileges of citizenship to those who are not in a position to carry out the duties of responsible citizens. Many peoples to whom the concepts and workings of political democracy were strange have failed to make effective use of

democratic constitutions. Only a politically educated people can work a democratic government.

Such a limitation would also go far to remove the second obstacle, which arises from mere numbers. The population of All-India, like that of China, is larger than that of the fifteen democratic states listed by C. K. Streit; so that on his basis of representation in simple proportion to total population either of these countries, if it were admitted, would elect more members to the legislature than all the "White" peoples of those states. That initial condition would obviously decide all the other states against entering such a union.\* If, however, representation is to be proportional to numbers of electors, then the simple requirement of literacy would admit ninety-five per cent of the adults of the more advanced countries and, at present, not more than ten to fifteen per cent of the Indians. The limitation of the privileges of citizenship,† which include the vote and the right to be a candidate for election to any governing assembly, to those adults who are qualified to carry out the duties of citizens, is one of the simplest means of securing stability in a democratic state.

Since the method of free general election is the best method yet discovered of obtaining the consent of the

\* A totally different method of deciding the number of representatives of each country in the central assembly of a Union is to make it proportional to the contribution each makes to the cost of the government. These contributions could be determined on the basis of ability to pay.

† Not of the Rights of Man.

governed to the general policy and methods of the government, it is politically necessary that the citizens (electors) shall include an effective majority of the politically conscious adults in the state. Further, in order to forestall oppression, it is essential that the status of citizen shall be in fact accessible to all who fulfil the prescribed requirements; and that these requirements shall be set out clearly, be known to all, and be such that a large majority approve them as reasonable. In all the democratic states there is first an age limit, usually twenty-one years.\* This figure is not sacrosanct; and, in view of the steady lengthening of the educational process and the resulting postponement of the age at which the young folk take up the ordinary responsibilities of adult life, there is now a strong case for raising it (say to 25) and so limiting citizenship more definitely to adults. It is usual also to exclude the insane and criminals, and it was formerly also customary to exclude from voting all persons in receipt of public assistance. It seems equally justifiable to exclude the illiterate in a world which must necessarily demand a higher standard from all its citizens, and which provides at least an elementary schooling for all its children. The exclusion of the analphabets from the privileges of world citizenship would automatically increase the relative importance of those populations among whom there is a higher level of education; and at the same time provide a strong motive for every state to improve its schooling

\* This is not necessarily the same for all the duties or privileges; in some states no citizen may be elected to certain high offices below the age of thirty.

systems in order to increase its number of electors, and so its effective representation.

As an immediate measure such a restriction might be justifiable largely because it would make it possible in practice to admit such countries as India and China without the danger of swamping the whole commonwealth by an unwieldy mass of ignorant voters. But as a permanent measure it could be maintained only if the possibility of acquiring all the qualifications for citizenship is made effectively open to all subjects by an adequate system of schools and educational facilities. Provided that the standard to be attained by the would-be citizen is one that is in fact attainable by a substantial majority of all adults, irrespective of race or religion or class, the higher that standard is set the better for the world. The ideal before us and the standards to be reached are entirely independent of race or colour; and the Indian has no less capacity for devotion to a high ideal than have the most ardent and self-sacrificing peoples of any other land.

The position of the Chinese is also ignored by many advocates of "Federal Union." Yet the Chinese number from a sixth to a fourth of mankind; and any world plan which does not include them is woefully incomplete. China is not a dependency; though the Japanese are now striving to reduce it to that status. At present the Chinese are maintaining, and have maintained since the middle of 1937, a fight against imperialist aggression in which they have shown themselves capable of courage and self-sacrifice in no way inferior to that of the peoples of the West. They have fought



alone, with inferior equipment and arms, supported by much verbal encouragement but little material help from the Western democratic peoples.

Chinese culture and its political traditions are, apparently, nearer to those of the Western democracies than are those of India; and a free China could well co-operate with other free peoples in the development of a World Commonwealth. Since the Chinese, by their position and numbers, occupy most of the third of the major human regions (see p. 23), their final importance to any plan for the organization of mankind is of the same order as that of "Europe" or "America." It is true that they are not at present in a position to give any effective lead; but the democratic peoples cannot afford to allow the great human and material resources of China to become the tools of an aggressive imperialism. China is essential to a World Commonwealth; and the Chinese will necessarily be one of the more important peoples in its development.

The lands of the Muhammadan world are also of comparable importance, though less populous than "Europe" or China. Their peoples share a very democratic social tradition. One whose position is of special interest is Egypt, now an ally of Britain. Egypt is an independent state with a democratic constitution and a parliamentary form of government. Geographically it is an outlier of the major human region of Europe, locally isolated by the desert, but firmly linked with the populous lands by its position on the great water- and air-ways from Europe to India and east Africa. Egypt is not so great, in either population or natural resources,

as to form a large state. Why should it not be included in any scheme of democratic federation? Egypt is one of the important independent states of the Muhammadan world, and in some respects a key state of that group of lands. So that its omission from the schemes most widely advocated gives ground for the assertion that their advocates feel that liberty and democracy are for white men only; and that they intend to maintain the White supremacy which has been a characteristic feature of the political organization, or disorganization, of the world during the last hundred years. Their exclusion of all countries of other than the Christian tradition gives ground for the accusation that those advocates of "Federal Union" are still dominated by racial and religious exclusiveness. But a World Commonwealth must be wider than the range of any one race or religion.

This is not the place to attempt to account for every people; though it is clear that the widely differing stages of development among different peoples make it impossible for all to be included at once on the same footing. At the present stage it is urgent to start the co-operation among peoples and states from which the commonwealth can grow; and for this the important peoples are those of the Western democracies. But if they limit their co-operation to any exclusive groupings, of religion or colour or race, the hopes of world unity will thereby be foredoomed to frustration. The final unit for a World Commonwealth is mankind.

## VIII

### IDEOLOGIES AND EDUCATION

ONE of the most important characteristics of any civilization, or nation, or people, is that which it is now customary to speak of as its ideology—that is, the group of beliefs and ideas which is generally accepted among its members. This forms the background of the prejudices and thoughts of the majority, and so determines many of their mental habits, and in particular their attitude to all new or strange ideas and suggestions which may come to them. The importance of this ideology is not lessened by the fact that for the vast majority it is, in so far as it is consciously held, nothing more than an accepted rationalization of their customs and prejudices, or that to members of the ruling classes it may be no more than a cloak for their ambitions. It is none the less the chief determinant of their attitudes to other peoples and of their reactions to other ideas.

The effect of a new idea or suggestion depends at least as much on the mental background into which it falls, against which it is judged, as on its intrinsic merits or demerits. The mental background is apparently formed mainly in childhood; though in some few individuals it may be modified, to varying extents, by later experiences and beliefs; and the whole of our formal and informal educational efforts, except for purely

technical training, are essentially efforts to form and strengthen the type of mental background approved by those who are in effective control of the educating forces.

A fundamental distinction between the democratic and the non-democratic peoples is that the former regard the individual as the unit of their organized life, and his or her duties and rights as the bases of their social and legal systems; while the latter base their ideology and organized life on some other unit, usually an idealized state, or nation, or race, or monarch, or the family, and regard all individuals as subordinate to that. This quite fundamental difference affects all their attitudes to social and personal relationships; so much so that they may have no common language for the discussion of such matters. For instance, the concept of justice in the nazi legal system bears little resemblance to that current among the democracies; both its bases and its aims are different.

All the democratic states have in some form a basic law which defines, and guarantees to every citizen, certain specified fundamental rights. Such are the English "Bill of Rights," the American "Declaration of the Rights of Man," and the French revolutionary proclamation of the "Droits de l'Homme," woven into the habits of their peoples and the constitutions of their states. In our own days there is a tendency to add supplementary claims in respect to economic rights, which cover at least the minimum demands that the democratic state must guarantee all its people against destitution, and that it should secure, to all

its future citizens an adequate preparation for the fulfilment of their duties and the exercise of their rights as citizens. This last is a very far-reaching claim, since it covers the care of physical well-being and of education in the widest sense of that term; to that extent it defines some of the chief purposes and duties of a democratic government.

The precise form and content of such an extended declaration of the Rights of Man,\* which could form a fundamental law of a democratic world commonwealth, are matters for the widest public discussion. But it seems clear that it should include exact definitions and guarantees of the following essential rights of the individual human being :—

1. Liberty under the law—of speech, of the press, and of association; and adequate security against imprisonment or punishment except after fair and open trial and conviction by a legally constituted court.

2. Equality before the law—for all individuals and governments and corporate bodies.

3. The right to become a voter, with an equal vote in the election of the law-making and governing bodies, as soon as he, or she, satisfies certain clearly defined conditions which are generally approved and should also be generally known.

\* Such a declaration has, on the suggestion of Mr. H. G. Wells, been drafted in this country; and it now expresses better than any one individual can hope to do the democratic concept of the Rights of Man. It is given on pp. 84–89 of his *The Common Sense of War and Peace* (a Penguin Special); 1940.

4. The right to be a candidate for election to those bodies on similarly well-defined and known conditions.

5. Protection against destitution.

6. For the young, educational preparation such as will fit them for the adequate fulfilment of all the duties of citizenship.

If the World Commonwealth is to be based on some such fundamental law it is clear that its authority must be sufficient to ensure that this law is observed in all its states and territories. So there must be a supreme court, reasonably accessible, and power to enforce the decisions of that court. This seems to be an essential part of the organization of the commonwealth; and it is clear that it implies a right of appeal to the supreme court, from the decision of any local or state court, in matters touching the fundamental laws of the commonwealth.

A commonwealth which bases itself on the individual citizen in this way can survive only on condition that a sufficiently large number of its citizens give it their active support, and that the rest of the citizens and its subjects acquiesce in its rule. To obtain this support it is essential to educate the people so that they shall know and understand the principles of the constitution and its working, and be able to give it an intelligent support. Thus one of the primary duties of a democratic state is to provide the best possible education for all its children and its citizens; and the efficient fulfilment of this duty is essential to

its own continuance. Tyrannies may thrive in the dark on the ignorance of their subjects. Freedom can flourish only in the light of knowledge and open discussion.

Education is by no means a matter solely for the schools and colleges which undertake the formal schooling of children and adolescents. That is a vital part of education, but only a part. In fact, the education of any one of us is compounded of the effects on the individual of all the environmental conditions which have moulded his mind and his body. Of these influences those which are most readily dominated by the state are the school, the radio, and the press, all of which are fully under governmental control in every well-organized tyranny.

Freedom of the press, of association, and of public discussion is essential to any democratic people ; since without it they cannot be adequately informed on matters which concern them, nor can there be adequate public criticism of their representatives and governments. But this freedom can best be attained by leaving it to individuals and associations to discuss and publish freely, and by prevention of any monopoly or restriction of means of publication. It is for the law and government to protect such freedom, not to control it.

A school, however, must be controlled by some authority. It is only in virtue of the laws which compel attendance at school that it is possible to ensure that all children receive some formal education; and, since it is the state which makes and enforces these laws, the state is responsible for the

schools and for all that is done in them. It should not shirk that responsibility by delegation to any sectional or denominational bodies. The schools are so vital to democracy that the governments, which are the elected agents of the citizens, must not be allowed to evade direct responsibility for them.

The purpose of formal schooling, among all peoples and at all times, is primarily to fit the young into the scheme of life approved by the ruling sections of the society in which they are living—i.e., to build up the required ideology. The training given and the knowledge, habits and beliefs inculcated are those which adapt the child to the existing society. This undoubtedly tends to discourage individual variations, desirable or undesirable or merely incomprehensible, including those of genius, just because and in so far as they are not readily adaptable to the norms of the social life.

In an authoritarian society the child is taught dogmatically; and the aim, which may not be admitted or openly avowed, is to develop in him the mental attitude which accepts the dicta of Authority and evades the exertion of independent thinking. It is not a high aim; and with the great majority it is easily attained; for persons of inquiring and critical mind are probably a minority of mankind, and most of such minds can be effectively smothered in youth. Most adults are still authoritarian in their attitudes towards children. But among the democratic peoples there have been great changes in the school atmosphere within recent generations; and in many of their schools there is now an attempt to lead children to



think out simple fundamental principles for themselves rather than to accept them as dogmas. This is a hopeful change; for persons capable of independent and constructive thinking are necessary to the maintenance of freedom and to intellectual progress. Yet this process of rational teaching by explanation makes far greater demands on the abilities and skill and energy of the teacher than does that of dogmatic presentation; hence there is a constant tendency for the overworked, or less efficient, teacher to fall back on the easier authoritarian methods.

The standards of the schools and teachers of a country are a direct reflection of their importance in the minds of the ruling classes. A country has the schools it deserves. In no land are these standards as high as they should be if the schools are to form a people capable of maintaining free institutions in the increasingly complex environment of our modern civilization. Every advance in knowledge, and in its applications, leads to greater demands on the capacity and intelligence of the people, and makes it more necessary that these shall be developed as fully as possible. So the process of formal education is intensified, and the school-leaving age is raised; while the higher stages of specialized technical and professional training also become more and more arduous.

Schooling is not generally compulsory after the primary school stage; and far too large a proportion of our future citizens receive no systematic education or training during the impressionable and formative years of their adolescence, in spite of the vital im-

portance of these years for physical, emotional, and mental growth and development. This failure to care for the young is one of the chief ways in which society provides recruits to the gangsters and ruffians who have been in the past, and are likely to be in the future, the effective supporters and agents of tyrants in many lands. The energy and idealism of the normal adolescents, carried on into early maturity, are among the strongest forces in human life; they are capable of wrecking any society which does not provide them with adequate outlets. If the idealism of youth cannot be harnessed to a star it may follow a will-o'-the-wisp into the marshes of disaster.

The universities which form the highest part of the system of formal education in Western Civilization are one of its essential and characteristic organs. They grew up in the later Middle Ages, when Paris arose as a principal focus of culture, and spread over Western Christendom before the end of that epoch. Their development was a part, and a cause, of the renaissance which ushered in the modern world. But the greatest expansion in their numbers and in the range of their studies has taken place within the last hundred years, in response to the increase of knowledge.

A university, as the name implies, is a body which admits no limits to its pursuit of knowledge, and aims at universal understanding. Its essential foundation is freedom of learning and of teaching—the *lernfreiheit und lehrfreiheit*, so well upheld by the German universities of the great ages of German thought. But inextricably interwoven with their primary duty

to the development and spread of knowledge is the parallel duty of training those citizens from among whom the leaders in the community are likely to arise. The training of men for the professions and the civil services has for centuries been a main function of the universities; and in recent generations they have also included among their students most of the future leaders in government and in economic life, politicians and statesmen, professional and business men, and technologists of many types. This work makes them essential to the state and commonwealth; it has led to increasingly close contacts between governments and universities—so much so that in many lands the universities tend to become too directly dependent on the government for their financial resources and are in danger of losing that complete freedom, of thought and inquiry and expression, which is the most essential condition of the advancement of knowledge. For the price of freedom is continual vigilance, with keen criticism, both destructive and constructive; so that anything which lessens freedom of thought and expression is a danger to all freedom.

The realization of the possibilities of using a general and compulsory school system to mould the children of a nation into the type approved by the governing authorities seems to have spread slowly during the nineteenth century. In North America the English colonists from the first regarded schooling as essential to the preservation and continuance of their democracy; and later it was also valued as a means of assimilating the children of foreign immigrants. There

the public school was, and is, the nation-maker, in that it provides a basis on which the press, the cinema, the radio, and other agencies of adult education and instruction can build to produce the American or Canadian citizen.

In Europe the churches realized even earlier the importance, for their own continuance, of control of the schools; and from the reformation period the various churches have struggled, against the state and one another, for the power to impose their own beliefs and dogmas on the minds of the young. During the French revolution the states began to impress all their young men into conscript armies, and there attempted to mould their minds as well as their bodies to the service of the state and the furtherance of its power. It was left to Prussia to be the first important state to apply these ideas thoroughly and systematically. The schools there, as elsewhere, existed to make good subjects for the king; and Prussia led in the development and elaboration of the revived state-worship which is a large part of some of the more important of modern political ideologies.

Over against the ideology of state-worship is that of democracy, which bases itself on the liberty of the individual citizen and tends, when it becomes mystical, to idealize an abstract conception of the "people"; though the crowd is no more worthy of worship than is the state.

The outstanding slogan of democracy was proclaimed in the French revolution, with its demand for "*Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.*" At that time the

stress was inevitably on liberty, because the lack of personal freedom was the most obvious and pressing evil. But it soon became clear that liberty cannot be unlimited. Liberty in a democracy is liberty under the law, limited for each one by the corresponding liberties of others. It is not, and cannot be, licence reaching to anarchy, since that would destroy liberty. It extends also to some degree of social freedom; but the attempt in some countries to establish economic freedom is as yet an aspiration rather than a fact.

In practice political democracy includes at least three essential features, namely :—

1. The rule of law—a law which is made and can be changed only by an elected legislative assembly, and is enforced equally on all;
2. Responsibility of the executive government to the electors, directly in the presidential system, or indirectly through an elected assembly in the parliamentary system;
3. A high level of personal freedom.

Such a democracy must rest on an educated people. It can be established and maintained only by citizens who believe in its principles and are sufficiently educated and courageous to understand and apply them. Any person in a genuinely democratic state may defy any illegal demand or threat, and be safe under the protection of the law.

The existence of gross economic inequalities between citizens within the greater democracies gives undue power in them to the merely rich; and so goes far to

justify the accusation that they are in fact plutocracies, or at best pluto-democracies, which is one of the strongest propaganda weapons of their nazi and marxist enemies. Plutocracy is the evil genius of the capitalist democracies. In its extreme forms it has far less appeal to normal humans than have the tyrannies; for it has no generous ideals and can never inspire free men. It can arm only mercenaries. Even nazidom is on a higher moral plane; for plutocracy has no morality beyond the cash nexus. The political equality of men in the democracies is inevitably incomplete, even in purely political affairs, until all of them share an economic security. Their chief need is progress towards that economic democracy. It must be recognized that every member of the human community is equally heir to all the achievements of mankind, and so is entitled to a share in the produce of the community merely because he is one of its members; just as the claim of a child to a place at the family table is that he is one of the family.

The third element in the democratic aspirations—brotherhood—is primarily a spiritual aim. It is soundly based on the biological fact that all mankind is a single species, and on the social fact that we are all mutually interdependent members of the human community. It is the most fundamental and inclusive of the three aims of democracy, and the one most difficult of attainment; but it can be the best guide to its law-makers and governments in all their work. That political and economic and social system which best aids the growth of a real brotherhood among men

is the only one which can be finally satisfactory and stable.

Standing apart from, and hostile to, these democratic aspirations are those of the totalitarian states, in which the state is regarded as an organism having a life of its own to which all its peoples are subordinate. In fact the state, like all other human groups, is a changeable and changing thing. It is not an absolute, or even an independent phenomenon, but merely one of many human groups, akin to family, clan, tribe, nation, church, and other associations of human beings. Like them, it grew out of human needs and desires and is subject to human emotions and wills. It is a human device for human ends; and it is justifiable only in so far as it serves those ends.

Every such group tends to develop a life of its own and to arouse loyalty among its members. In the modern world the state is probably the strongest group; and its claim on the loyalty of its members, which it calls patriotism, is often stronger than the claims of family or church or class. Yet this greater strength of the state is a comparatively recent development. Five centuries ago, in Western Civilization, men were Christians or Muslims before they were Germans or Turks. To-day the state may be losing its hold; for there is evidence that some communists and nazis, in lands other than the communist and nazi states, put loyalty to their faith before loyalty to the state of which they are citizens. Others may put loyalty to their church first.

But in the view of the upholders and theorists of the absolute state it is the highest being. And man exists

only in and for the state, which exists only for its own aggrandizement and glorification, without regard for the well-being of its peoples except in so far as that may subserve its own interests. This doctrine entirely repudiates the liberty of the democracies, and denies that the individual has any rights. In practice, of course, the state is the ruling people; and so this theory of the totalitarian state is merely a rationalization of autocracy. In each of the totalitarian states the real government and state is a single party, which tolerates no criticism or opposition, and its leader. This is essentially gangster rule; and its philosophy of the state is of value chiefly in so far as it directs attention away from the individual despot to an abstraction which can be made acceptable to many of the people. The claim for the complete freedom of the state involves a denial of the freedom of men. It thus sacrifices the greater good.

The conflict of these ideologies emphasizes, and adds to, the disorder of the world. It underlines the fact that the world of man is even now so far one that these various and incompatible ways of life cannot remain wholly apart. No tyrant can feel secure while freedom exists anywhere on the earth; for the idea of freedom is pervasive and will seep through any frontier guard; and the tyrant cannot tolerate criticism. The only solvent of the world's disorders is an ordered freedom maintained by an education for free citizens. In a world of free men separate states will be necessary, and therefore justifiable, only as convenient administrative divisions.



The philosophy of the absolute state has been strongly developed in Germany during the past century; and in the present nazi party, which now dominates that country, it is strengthened and given emotional force by being merged with an idealization of the Germans as a "chosen people," a "master race," inherently superior to all other human beings, and by virtue of that superiority having both a right and a duty to rule all other peoples and use them for its own purposes. The fact which has made the Germans a danger to their neighbours, and to the world, is their belief in their own superiority and, its corollary, in their duty to dominate all the inferior peoples. This belief has been a part of the Prussian-German tradition for the last two centuries; and it is very deeply entrenched. Until it is eliminated, and the Germans are ready to deal with other peoples as equals, a strong Germany will be a world danger.

The view that the German-speaking peoples in Europe are a distinct or homogeneous race, in any scientific sense of that much-misused term, is quite untenable. And the view that any one people is inherently superior to all others is equally without any basis in fact; though it has been held by many conquering peoples during the period of their success. It is important to note that this concept of a superior German race and state makes it impossible for that state to co-operate with any other on a basis of equality, or for the Germans to absorb or assimilate any other peoples. The German "race" can increase in numbers only by its own excess of births over deaths; and its state can expand only by con-

quest, followed by the massacre or expulsion of the conquered peoples and the settlement of the vacant lands by Germans. This method of expansion is now being applied in the Czech lands, in Lorraine, and in Poland; and the application emphasizes the fact that the nazi state is incapable of equal union with any others. Nazi Germany cannot enter honestly into any sort of equal union or alliance, European or wider, so long as it holds to its racial beliefs. The only union possible to it involves the subjection of all other peoples. Such a racialism is partly due to an inferiority complex which causes the nazis to doubt their own capacity for the difficult tasks of adjustment in a world of freedom and equality among men.

The other prominent exponent of political totalitarianism in Europe was fascist Italy. Here the totalitarian theory of the state is not complicated by any racial mysticism; though the fascist party has played on and inflamed Italian patriotism and nationalism. Further, the party had to compromise with a rival authoritarian power in the Roman Catholic church, which is equally prepared to enforce its claims on its members up to the limits of its power. That church is neither racial nor nationalist; though it has often used and compromised with nationalists and patriots. It is the chief power of Christendom; and it still pursues the missionary effort to bring all mankind into its fold. In the struggle between the Roman church and the fascist party the church won on all the matters which it regards as essential; since it maintained its very considerable influence on the edu-

cation of the young and of adults; and it waited in the confident belief that it would outlive the "Duce".

The fascist movement rose to success as a reaction against the disorders due to the failure of parliamentary government in Italy. It imposed order at the sacrifice of liberty, which it repudiates; and it developed an elaborate organization of the political and economic life of the people in complete subjection to its leaders. Much of this order and discipline aroused admiration in other countries; and in some cases this admiration has led to imitation. This has been most widespread and successful in other Roman Catholic countries; so much so that it seems possible that some form of fascism may become the political aspect of Roman Catholicism. There are still strong fascist parties in many countries. They are in general most influential where a democratic constitution had been imported without having been based on a politically educated people, and so had not been fully assimilated. The resultant failure of weak democratic governments inevitably led to disorder, which provoked reaction towards dictatorship when the disillusioned peoples demanded order, without which there can be no lasting liberty. In its denial of liberty and equality and of the rights of the individual, and in its concept of the complete subjection of the individual to the state, fascism is essentially incompatible with, and hostile to, democracy. Yet its tyranny could not have arisen but for the failure of Italian parliamentary governments to maintain the order and security which are essential to liberty.

The philosophy of fascism has, for the most part, been developed as an apology for, and explanation of, the working of the fascist state; so that it is an effect rather than a cause. It is in sympathy with some Italian political thought of the renaissance period. In many respects the fascist "Duce" was the spiritual heir of Macchiavelli's "prince," and his policy had as little regard for any moral or spiritual values. In so far as it is in fact guided by this philosophy, a fascist state is an end in itself and for itself; and it aims only at the increase of its own power. Thus it is clear that no peaceful merging of such states is possible, and the union or close alliance of two such states implies the subordination of one of them; as fascist Italy was subordinate to nazi Germany. Still less is it conceivable that such a state could be an honest member of a democratic union, any more than it was of the League of Nations. It is, however, doubtful how far this philosophy has yet become part of the ideology of the peoples of the fascist states; it may be limited to members of the ruling classes in the fascist parties.

The marxist communism of the Soviet Union is the other ideology now dominant in an important European state. Here marxism has the character and force of a new religion, although it repudiates supernaturalism; and many of its devotees show all the fervour of the proselyte. It claims as complete a dominion over the minds and bodies of its members and subjects as does any church, and equally punishes any deviation from the party line; so that in its early stages it is a persecuting and proselytizing faith, as were most other

great religions at the corresponding stages of their growth. The state which it has made is equally totalitarian in so far as it claims to absorb and control the whole life of every one of its subjects; and it tolerates no opposition. Its proclaimed rule is a "Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; but since so amorphous a mass as the proletariat cannot exercise any definite authority, the ruling class is drawn from and supported by the communist party, which is a comparatively small oligarchy, including perhaps a fiftieth of the population.

The formal constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has many resemblances to democratic forms of government. The union is, in form, a federal republic; though, since one of its member states has three-fourths of the area and nearly two-thirds of the population, it is an ill-balanced federation. But in its present practice it is a dictatorship under a small oligarchy, which is in control of all the forces of the state. In the last quarter of 1939 the foreign policy of the Soviet Union openly reverted to the imperialist expansionism of Tsarist Russia; and it is now recognizably the old Russian Empire under new management, with a strong nationalist cult. Yet it has developed a literate population by a very vigorous educational policy; its educational system has inculcated the ideals of equality and brotherhood common to the democracies, if not that of liberty. It has destroyed some of the obstacles to human brotherhood, and it has none of the "racial" intolerances of the nazi system; so

that it is a far more hopeful experiment in human organization. It has concentrated on the attempt to attain economic equality; for this aim it has sacrificed or subordinated liberty and is in danger of falling back into tyranny. But its equalitarianism brings some of its ideals much nearer to those of democracy than to the state-worship of the nazi and fascist despotisms. Therefore it is in some respects intermediate between the democratic and the totalitarian states, sharing some qualities of each. In which direction will it develop?

In Japan the state-worship has been developed rather as a theocracy; for the emperor, who is the embodiment of the state, is the living god of Shintoism, the state religion, though he is not a direct leader in the nazi sense. This system is of longer standing, and is probably far more deeply rooted in the hearts and minds and habits of the people, than any of the European totalitarianisms. It has produced a people capable of fanatical self-sacrifice; but it had, before 1942, much less force at its command than the German state. It is also confined to one nation remote from the chief focal area of the world; and it is therefore less important than the European cases of state-worship.

Though Germany and Japan are at present allied against the democracies and the Soviet Union,\* their own aims are intrinsically incompatible. Each aims only at the increase of its own power; and its

\* In spite of the pact of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in April 1941, the alliance of the totalitarian powers is partly aimed at the Soviet Union.

people are taught to regard themselves as a "chosen people." If they could defeat the democracies they must then inevitably fight one another. Japan stood a little aloof from her European allies, eager to use every opportunity to extend her empire given by the pre-occupation of the democracies, but chary of any extension of her own war until, on Dec. 7, 1941, she attacked both Britain and the United States. Evidently by that date the rulers of Japan were convinced that they could turn the balance of war decisively against the democracies, that the potential military strength of America could not be made effective in time to prevent the victory on which they calculated, and that Japan should occupy the lands she coveted before Germany claimed them as spoils of war. Events have already disproved the first two assumptions.

In contrast, the democracies risk nothing of their own principles by co-operation, or even union, with one another; and the success of any one of them in the wars against the aggressor tyrannies will increase the security of all of them. They are natural allies; for they fight for the same principles; and not until their enemies are reduced to impotence will the world be really safe for democracy. Such a temporary impotence may result from defeat in war and internal collapse, as it did in 1918. But the security of the free peoples can be made lasting only if all peoples can be educated to become free men and women and citizens of a free world.

## IX

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

THE world is one.

It is some time since the British peoples realized that "the seas are one"; though as a real factor in their habitual attitudes that realization seems to have been confined to a few of their leaders. It did not reach the land-bound minds of the continental peoples. But now the development of aircraft has made many peoples air-minded, and fully conscious that "the air is one." A realization of the oneness of the whole world is being driven into the minds of all the civilized peoples, in spite of attempts to take mental refuge in "regions."

No part of the world of man can now remain isolated from, or independent of, the rest. The separation of the civilizations of the past from one another was due only to their failure to develop adequate means of communication. They grew up in the more favourable regions of the earth, where man could most easily obtain a regular and sufficient supply of food and of the materials needed for his tools. Where also he must develop sufficient foresight and organization to solve the problems presented by the regular alternation of seed-time and harvest, and the occurrence of seasons of dearth.

This development gave us the three great civilizations of the Old World, in its three major human regions of "Europe," India, and East Asia. The three were



similar in fundamentals; for in each man met and solved the same fundamental problems. But there were, and are, important differences among them due to the different geographical environments.

“Europe” is the most varied in its intermingling of sea and land, in its surface relief, in its variety of climates and soils. And because it is the farthest from the equator the difficulties to be overcome, at least in its central and northern lands, were much greater than those which faced the agriculturists of India and the Far East. So Europe developed the strongest and most varied of the three civilizations; and it was the Europeans who at last solved the problems of sea-faring, and made the ocean a highway instead of an impassable barrier. Thus they introduced the modern age, in which the physical fact that the earth is one has also become a human fact.

In its trans-oceanic spread Western Civilization found and occupied the one fertile region of the New World which is comparable in magnitude and natural resources with the three such regions of Mainland. It so happens that this region of Eastern North America is also the part of the New World nearest to Europe. Within the last three centuries it has been settled by Europeans and has become the second major region of Western Civilization.

So our world is based on a very few important regions of human development. The four major human regions to which we have referred together contain three-fourths of mankind. Of them India is the least important, chiefly it seems because it is tropical in

location and therefore in climate. The other three are all in the north temperate zone. They are the homelands of half of mankind and of all the great powers (see table on p. 23).

"Europe" is the largest and most varied of these great human regions. Also, since the age of discovery, it is the central one, nearer to each of the others than they are to one another, and central in the land hemisphere. It is the obvious leader and focus of an organized world civilization. But Europe is also the least united within itself. Its peoples are held apart by the lack of a common language, memories of wars and oppressions, the myths of nationalisms, and all the propaganda which uses these things and the ignorance of the peoples to keep them apart. They are also divided by their adherence to different ideologies, and the natural human desire to impose one's own on other folk—by force if argument does not succeed. Not until they learn the lessons of mutual tolerance can Europe be effectively united.

"America" is much more nearly one region in political and cultural matters. True it is divided between two independent states, Canada and the United States, and two linguistic cultures, English and French. But fortunately the two divisions do not coincide; and in each case one of the two is much more populous than the other, and its habits and traditions are those of tolerance. In most of its cultural and economic development the major human region of Eastern North America is effectively one region.

The Far Eastern region, like the American, has only

two independent states, China and Japan. But these are less unequal; and the Japanese aims of conquest have made them hostile. Yet there is a considerable unity of culture. Neither of these smaller regions is so much divided against itself as is Europe.

The union of each of these regions into one super-state would divide the world among three greater powers, and probably lead to war on a scale even greater than that of the first two world wars of this century. For, though these regions were separate before the modern age, the world is now effectively one and they can no longer live apart from each other. For each of them, and for all other countries, the interests and activities of their peoples reach out to all the world and cannot be confined to any one region.

The present conflict is essentially a war of ideologies, a contest between the way of life of the free peoples on the one side and that of the totalitarian despots and their ordered tyrannies on the other—between the Rule of Law and the Rule of Force.

Because of the change of scale in human affairs and the progressive unifying of the world, it is more important than former wars. All the great powers are fully engaged in it. It is being fought out in the focal areas of the most important of the major human regions; and its results will decide the fate of the next generations. As the last war was fought for the freedom of nations, this war should be for the freedom of men. Patriotism is not enough.

The Germans submitted to a leader of genius who developed from their autocratic governments the

most completely organized tyranny that the world has yet seen. This tyranny tried to control both the minds and the bodies of all its subjects, and has based itself and its hopes of permanence mainly on a systematic moulding of the minds of the young to its ways of thought and life. The long-established German habit of submission to Authority, and German capacity for organizing and being organized, wielded by logically unscrupulous rulers and supported by the technical skill and knowledge of one of the greatest of the industrial powers, enabled those rulers to build up a military force which was in 1939 far stronger on land and in the air than that of any other state. It was frankly built for conquest; and simultaneously the minds of its people were conditioned for aggressive war. Such a rule accepted by so great a people threatens the end of freedom on the earth.

Against such preparation the democratic states are handicapped by some of their own essential qualities. No government in a free country can hope to prepare for, or to carry on, a great war without the full support of the people. The despot can make his preparations in secret. A self-governing people will not give so much of their energies to war until they are convinced that the issues are really vital to them. Hence the despot who prepares for aggressive war can always gain a long start in political and military preparedness. The one important exception to this democratic unreadiness for defence is based on the naval traditions of the two great English democracies. It was the strength of the British navy which delayed the success

of the nazi *Blitzkrieg* sufficiently to allow the nation to prepare on an adequate scale to meet it, after the German conquest of the Low Countries. Similarly the United States navy for two years imposed a check on the still wider extension of the war. It may be that democracy will owe its survival to the fact that its two great powers were insular.

The other apparent weakness of the democracies in the face of aggressive tyrannies lies in the tolerant desire of their peoples to "live and let live," to avoid interference in the affairs of others. Each of them desires chiefly to go its way in peace and tends to believe, because it wishes to believe, that other states and nations share this desire. And it has hitherto generally refused to admit or accept responsibilities outside its own borders, asking, "Am I my brother's keeper?" This attitude has prevented them from making any adequate preparations or effective unions for mutual defence, or building up a world-wide system of collective security; and the democratic states of Europe faced the long-threatened pounce of the aggressive powers as a group of rabbits face the attack of a stoat. Each hoped he would not be the first victim and that the beast of prey would be glutted before coming to him. They were all "appeasers"—at any one else's expense. Their political sins were sins of omission. Their model statesman was Ethelred the Unready.

But an aggressive tyranny cannot let peaceful states alone. It is inherent in the ideology of state-worship that its state must continually expand; it is conditioned for aggression. Many of the small states

which were in the path of the tyrannies now know this. Abyssinia and Albania, Austria and CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Denmark and Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium, JugoSlavia and Greece, were trampled down solely because they were in the path of totalitarian expansionism. France also was betrayed and trodden down. Romania is in a similar case to that of France. Italy, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria became subordinate clients of the nazi power. Sweden and Switzerland, in the eddies of the torrent, have so far kept a trembling hold on a precarious neutrality, and can strengthen that hold as the tyrant becomes weaker.

Outside the areas of active war in Europe and the Far East all other states and peoples are concerned. All the world is involved; for the ambitions and needs of the would-be world conquerors reach to every corner of the earth. If the world is to be made safe for free men it can only be as a world, not in any sheltered compartments. There are no longer any sheltered compartments.

The nazis and fascists have realized that the world is one, and that the pre-war anarchy of independent sovereign states cannot be restored. They loudly proclaimed their intention of establishing a "New Order" in Europe and the world. Their "new" order was essentially the old tyranny, made more hateful by its "racial" prejudice, strengthened by the systematic use of all the resources of technology, and extended to every part of human life. But the very real propaganda value of the proclamation lies in the fact, realized by too few people in our lands, that some world order is essential to civilization.

What alternative is to be put forward by the leaders of the free peoples? What kind of world order is to come out of a victory of the democratic states and the Soviet Union? When they have won will they attempt to restore the European tangle of petty and anarchic independent sovereign states? Have they no aim higher than merely to restore that inter-war Europe, which staggered so hesitatingly through the twenty years' truce, and leave it ready to fall victim to another tyranny after another few years of truce? To restore the conditions of the nineteen-thirties would be to restore the conditions which led to the present war. Is this latest world war enough to convince them that the world is not now big enough to hold both aggressive empires and peace-loving free peoples? If not, our children will have to fight it all over again. Eighty years ago it was true of the United States of America that "this country cannot endure half slave and half free." By now that is true of the world. We need a World Commonwealth of all civilized men, firmly based on the loyalty of all its citizens.

Any realist scheme for world organization must, even, or rather especially, in its earliest stages, take account of permanent geographical facts. The populous major human regions are the areas of prime importance for world organization, either for good or for ill. They are not of equal importance. "Europe" is the largest and the most populous, and probably the richest in variety of natural resources and in human initiative. The American region is probably to be ranked second in

all these respects, except in the mere number of its inhabitants. Its area is little more than that of the Far Eastern region, but it has a larger proportion of fertile lowland and over most of its extent better climates. In industrial resources and development it is probably now equal to the whole of mainland Europe. And it is completely held by free peoples, while both Europe and East Asia are at present divided.

The European and American major human regions are the homelands of modern Western Civilization. They are also the "Lands of the North Atlantic," grouped round that Midland Ocean as the homelands of classical Western Civilization are grouped round the Mediterranean Sea. And, in terms of transport and communications, the Midland Ocean is now a less obstacle to human organization than the Mediterranean Sea was two thousand years ago. As a group these lands include more than half the developed resources of the earth and the greater part of its industrial power. Their peoples also control a large part of the resources of the other half of the world. They have the further advantage of a central position among the lands of the globe and their scattered fertile regions (cf. Fig. 8, p. 38). Here, in a combination of America and Europe is a geographical base for either a World Commonwealth or a World Empire. These Atlantic lands and their peoples form a real unit in civilization and in present development, far more so than such solely political groups as the British or French empires, and in many respects even more so than "America" or "the Americas."

The great powers and the leading peoples of the world



of to-day are, for the most part, each limited mainly to one land region. Hence many of them are not yet conscious of the effective, though recent, unification of the world, and of the resulting facts that the problems of war and peace and of the utilization of the natural resources of the earth for the benefit of mankind are now world problems, none of which can be fully solved within any single region.

Only one of the present great powers is a world power. Only one of the leading peoples is accustomed to think in terms of world-wide relations. That is the British, whose Commonwealth lies on both sides of the Midland Ocean and at the antipodes of that ocean, whose Empire includes vast areas of the intertropical lands, and whose ships have long been known on all the seas. Their homelands in Great Britain, which is still the major state of their Commonwealth, are a slightly detached part of Europe, between that region and America. A partial organization of the world into its several great regions would break up the British Commonwealth. In a world organization it would be a link, and its homelands would be part of the principal focal area. No people have more to lose by the continuance of the world anarchy of separate independent sovereign states, or by the partial consolidation of those states into rival continental blocks. No people have more to gain from a worldwide unity and security; though these dangers and hopes are shared to a very large degree by all the peoples of western Europe.

At the end of this war we may expect to find the

affairs of the British and American Commonwealths intricately entangled all round the oceans in both the eastern and the western hemispheres, in all their economic and political relationships. From such a position it is possible either to move towards closer and more lasting union or to endeavour to go back to the former separation. The Americans have entered this "mix-up" as a single state; but the British states are in it in somewhat different relations. It is not the same for Canada as for Australia, for Great Britain as for New Zealand. The desirable result is undoubtedly that the two Commonwealths should continue together to uphold their common ideals of democratic freedom and tolerance. But contact can lead to friction as well as to understanding between peoples. And real co-operation can only come from understanding based upon fuller knowledge of each other and of the ideals which they have in common. Such an understanding should include all the peoples who share those ideals. It should not be limited to the Englishry.

It is also true that we may expect that the power and prestige of the Soviet Union will be one of the dominant facts in post-war Europe. Before 1941 the U.S.S.R. was, to a very large extent, an unknown quantity to the peoples of the Atlantic lands. Many of them, especially among their military and political leaders, shared the German opinion of it and believed that the German armies could conquer in the east as easily as they had done in the west. Those estimates of the strength of the Soviet Union have been revised. It is now fully recognized that the U.S.S.R. is one of the

greater military powers, and that it will play a leading part in the post-war settlement.

But there is still a great ideological difference between the Western allies and the Soviets. To a very large number, perhaps a majority, of the working classes in Britain the successes of the Red Armies have come as proof of the success of the socialist state ; and so of the rightness of the doctrines on which it is based ; for nothing succeeds like success. This demonstration of the strength and unity of the U.S.S.R. has shown that it is a strong state which has succeeded in evoking the loyalty of its peoples, and that we have much to learn from it. There are still many in the Western democracies who are afraid of " Bolshevism " ; and the future will probably see conflicts of propaganda, from which a sanely organized world of free men has nothing to fear. Insofar as Russia has made real advances in human welfare, and additions to knowledge in social and other sciences, the rest of the world will do well to learn from her. The greater the intellectual exchange between marxist and democrat the better for both of them ; but neither is likely to gain by friction and conflict between their states. Their ultimate union in the World Commonwealth may well be left to the growth of mutual understanding among their peoples.

Russia is likely to be one of the principal forces in the post-war settlement of Europe. We have no clear idea of the kind of settlement which her rulers desire. Evidently there is room and need for the fullest possible interchange and discussion between the Soviet peoples and their allies in the West. The definite

alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union is perhaps the strongest safeguard against the revival of German plans for world conquest for the next twenty years. The rebuilding of Europe will provide them with ample opportunity for the increase of mutual knowledge and comprehension ; while disagreement, or lack of sympathy, between them will give opportunity for a nazi or fascist revival.

What of the lands and peoples between the U.S.S.R. and the Atlantic? This is, or was, the area of maximum political disintegration. In 1938 it contained nearly half of the nominally independent sovereign states of the world. Right in the midst of it are the German lands ; and the Germans are, and will remain, the most numerous people in this limited Europe. They have spread hatred of themselves among all the other peoples. But the central thesis of their propaganda—the need for order—is unchallengeable. If the victorious powers cannot give to the peoples of Europe both order and freedom they will lose the peace, as they lost it after 1918, and so set the stage for another world war.

What is the real strength of the nationalisms which are made the bases of the demands for the separate independence of so many states in this Europe? Can the reasonable claims of nationalism be satisfied only by the establishment of a separate, and fully independent, sovereign state for each nation? If so there can be no lasting peace. It is probably true that no government will willingly acquiesce in any settlement which reduces its own importance. But what of

working? Racially the Germans are in no way distinguishable from their neighbours in Europe.\* The evil which has made them a danger to the world is a product of their training and traditions and geographical opportunities. If it can be fully exorcized they will again take a high place among the peoples of civilization.

The geographical position of Germany makes it impossible for a free world to leave her out of its organization. She is in the core of its most important human region. The hope for a free world depends largely on the active support of those many Germans who are lovers of freedom, and who are prepared to look on themselves as humans before they are Germans, to put humanity before *Deutschtum*.

The other totalitarian states are in far less important geographical positions. The Italians have a strong tradition of liberalism; and a free Italy may well fit easily into a free world. But in any case Italy's natural resources and geographical position leave her a comparatively weak state, incapable of making a serious bid for world empire. The fascist state was a public nuisance for more than two decades; though in its early years it needed only a firm stand by the western powers to call the Duce's bluff. The Italians are a great people who have made great contributions to civilization; but neither their industrial resources nor their military record entitles their state to be ranked among the greater powers in a warring world. In its last years fascist Italy was merely a client state of the

\* The need to make Poles in Germany wear a distinguishing badge is evidence of this likeness (see *The Times* of Sept. 20, 1940).

nazis, and the Italian people did not serve those masters with any enthusiasm. They would certainly be better off as members of a commonwealth of free peoples.

Because of their situation in the heart of Mainland, far from its open oceanic margins, the lands of the Soviet Union are somewhat aside and aloof from the rest of Europe, and its populous areas are far away from those of any other populous region; while it is more nearly self-sufficient and self-contained than is any other important state. These facts make it possible for the Atlantic democracies and the Soviet Union to leave each other alone. They have learned to respect each other; and there is no real cause for conflict between them.

In the Far East the aggressive power of the Japanese has so far failed to subdue China. It is hammering the Chinese into a united and patriotic nation; to which Japan will be inferior in numbers and in natural resources. Japan is an island state; but its naval power is much less than that of the Atlantic democracies; while its industrial power and its natural resources, especially in minerals, were also less than theirs. It is only the disunion and appeasement policies of the free peoples that have allowed Japan to embark on a career of conquest.

What is the position of the Englishry? They, in their two great commonwealths, are in present command of more than half the natural resources and developed industrial power of the earth. Of the four major human regions they are firmly based on the whole of the American and the chief islands of the

European. If they give a clear lead for freedom they can count on the support of much of mainland Europe and its peoples. All the Indian region is in their hands, and might still be won to support their cause in free co-operation. They have the sympathy of the majority people of the Far East, and can help them to freedom and co-operation. And the Englishry and their friends in the American republics control all the minor continents.

Against this vast, but only partly organized, power their present opponents can now muster in Europe less than an eighth of the world's population and resources, and a similar number in the Far East, including the recently conquered countries of whose peoples only the quislings are "loyal to the conquerors." These are formidable forces. But the energy and devotion of free men who realize that they work and fight for freedom can outlast the enthusiasm of even the willing subjects of the would-be world conquerors.

But victory in this war will not automatically establish a better world. The winning of the peace will be more difficult than the winning of the war. Without complete victory there can be no hope for the maintenance of democratic freedom, either political or economic. Yet the military victory will give only the possibility, a second chance in our time, of making a world "safe for democracy," a world in which men may have the "four freedoms" of the Atlantic Charter—which are really two freedoms, freedom of thought and expression and association, and freedom from fear of want and violence.

The full military defeat of Germany and Japan will prevent either of them from making another aggressive war in the next twenty years, which is but a short time for the organization of effective measures to prevent such wars. The defeat of 1918 did not alter the long-term policy of the Germans, or their belief that Germans are superior to all other people. The Japanese belief in their own racial superiority, and in their divine mission, is at least as firmly rooted as that of the Germans. Hence there is no reason to believe that a military defeat, however complete, will lead the rulers of either of these nations to abandon their beliefs or the aggressive policies which inevitably derive from them. Such beliefs and policies can be suppressed only if it is made quite clear that aggression will end in defeat. So the hope of peace rests on the establishment of a power sufficiently strong to convince would-be aggressors that they have no chance of success.

The century from 1815 to 1914 was the longest period of freedom from large-scale wars which the modern world has known. It was the century of the *Pax Britannica*, maintained by the British command of the high seas. That command rested on the strength of the United Kingdom alone. It was so used that it did not provoke alliances against it. And it was not challenged until Germany felt strong enough to prepare for world conquest.

It is clear that the strength of the United Kingdom alone is not now enough to maintain such a peace. No single state is now so strong that it cannot be hopefully challenged by an aggressor, as Japan challenged America.



And the development of air power has made it clear that naval power alone cannot maintain peace and security. There is no state which possesses so great a margin of effective strength as to be able to prevent aggressive wars by a would-be world conqueror. Such an aggressor may be, once again, defeated by a combination of free peoples. But the policy of waiting for the attack before forming such a combination is one which invites the attack.

The ancient habits and prejudices, and all the political and social groupings, of the world have been shaken by the two world wars of this generation and the breakdown of economic systems between them. These things kept the nations apart. But now the dividing forces are weakened, the world is in tumult, and men are searching for order amid the chaos. Thus the democratic peoples are now facing a second opportunity to remake the world and to bring their vision of freedom, equality, and brotherhood among men down to earth. They need only courage and unity. They can make a World Commonwealth; and for their own safety they can do no less. The free peoples can preserve their own freedom only by extending it to all peoples.

So we conclude that the first essential condition for the establishment and extension of freedom on the earth is a determination by the Englishry that they will establish it. They can defeat the German and Japanese attempts at world conquest. With their allies they can set up a commonwealth whose strength and freedom will attract other freedom-loving peoples and give to all its members security for the manifold task of building up a world in which their aspirations for the

brotherhood of man may be made possibilities, a task which will demand all their energies and abilities. But it is necessary for them to realize here and now that the world can no longer endure half free and half slave, and that the free peoples can secure their own freedom only by extending it. To secure freedom and peace on the earth it is not enough to have only goodwill. We need also a strong framework of law and order, and adequate power to enforce the law. The only power now capable of initiating such a framework is the combined strength of the British and American Commonwealths and their allies. If they fail freedom fails.

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